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Abstract 
 
The Internal Revenue Service is not usually thought of as the agency 
charged with enforcing the nation’s campaign finance laws. It has found 
itself, however, at the center of a firestorm over both its involvement and its 
ineptitude in enforcing certain rules that regulate the campaign activities of 
tax-exempt organizations. For historical, legal, and practical reasons, the 
Internal Revenue Code regulates the political activity of tax-exempt groups, 
in some instances providing for disclosure of campaign donors and 
expenditures, and in other instances limiting the amount of political activity 
engaged in by tax-exempt organizations. As campaigns become more 
sophisticated and complicated, pressure is placed on the rules regulating the 
political activity of tax-exempt organizations. The current structure 
regulating the political activity of tax-exempt organizations is unworkable, 
and the recent crisis resulting from the IRS’s use of partisan criteria to 
determine what applications for exempt status should come under further 
inquiry highlights the breakdown in the current regulatory regime. 
Just as it is wrong for the IRS to use partisan criteria in an 
unbalanced way to examine the applications of social welfare organizations, 
so too is it wrong for the IRS to refuse to enforce provisions in the Code 
regulating tax-exempt entities. To the extent that tax-exempt organizations 
are abusing their tax exempt status or are circumventing congressional 
intent with regard to the disclosure of campaign contributions, lax 
enforcement by the IRS also impacts our confidence in the agency. 
Unfortunately, under enforcement or over enforcement may have a partisan 
bias if groups engaging in one type of activity or another are dominated by 
one ideology.   
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In order to restore confidence in the fair and equitable treatment of 
groups engaged in political activity, Congress must take a broad approach 
that reforms the statutory framework for regulating tax-exempt 
organizations, fixes a broken enforcement process, and provides for greater 
transparency for actions taken by the IRS. This article explores the first step 
in the reform process, namely reform of the statutory framework regulating 
tax-exempt organizations involved in political campaign activity. Part II of 
this article outlines the current regulatory environment facing tax-exempt 
entities that wish to engage in political activities. Part III discusses the 
current crisis, including the IRS’s actions and the abusive activities of tax-
exempt organizations that caused many academics and politicians to call for 
better enforcement of the rules regarding political campaign intervention 
and tax-exempt entities. Part IV suggests reforms in the legal and regulatory 
rules governing tax-exempt entities. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Internal Revenue Service is not usually thought of as the agency 
charged with enforcing the nation’s campaign finance laws. It has found 
itself, however, at the center of a firestorm over both its involvement and its 
ineptitude in enforcing certain rules that regulate the campaign activities of 
tax-exempt organizations. For historical, legal, and practical reasons, the 
Internal Revenue Code regulates the political activity of tax-exempt groups, 
in some instances providing for disclosure of campaign donors and 
expenditures, and in other instances limiting the amount of political activity 
engaged in by tax-exempt organizations.
1
 Historically, almost all campaign 
activity was conducted by tax-exempt entities, be they political organizations 
regulated under section 527, social welfare organizations regulated under 
section 501(c)(4), labor unions regulated under section 501(c)(5), or business 
leagues regulated under section 501(c)(6).
2
 As campaigns become more 
sophisticated and complicated, pressure is placed on the rules regulating the 
political activity of tax-exempt organizations. The current structure 
regulating the political activity of tax-exempt organizations is unworkable, 
and the recent crisis resulting from the IRS’s use of partisan criteria to 
determine what applications for exempt status should come under further 
inquiry highlights the breakdown in the current regulatory regime.
3
 This 
                                                     
1. Corporations organized under section 501(c)(3) are prohibited from 
participating in, or intervening in any political campaign on behalf of (or in 
opposition to) any candidate for public office. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). Political 
organizations organized under section 527 are required to register with the IRS, 
publicly disclose their donors, and file periodic reports of contributions and 
expenditures. I.R.C. § 527(j). Social welfare organizations, labor unions, and 
business leagues, organized under sections 501(c)(4), (5), and (6) respectively, may 
intervene in political campaigns but must be primarily engaged in social welfare, 
labor, or business league related activities. 
2. Independent groups have traditionally been tax-exempt organizations 
because they generally have no business purpose and because election law 
significantly limited the activities of corporations. After the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), 
corporations can now make political campaign expenditures out of corporate 
treasury funds. As regulation of tax-exempt entities expands, independent groups 
may use taxable entities as a means of avoiding rules that govern tax-exempt 
organizations. See Donald Tobin, Political Advocacy and Taxable Entities, Are They 
the Next “Loophole”?, 6 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 41 (2007) [hereinafter Tobin, 
Political Advocacy].  
3. There is debate whether the IRS only targeted conservative groups or 
used partisan terms as a means of sorting whether an entity was engaged in partisan 
activity. It is clear, however, that the IRS used partisan terms in conducting its 
inquiries. TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION, 2013-10-053, 
INAPPROPRIATE CRITERIA WERE USED TO IDENTIFY TAX-EXEMPT APPLICATIONS FOR 
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breakdown has serious repercussions for not only efficient regulation of tax-
exempt organizations and campaign activity, but also for our nation’s 
confidence that the IRS is operating as a nonpartisan fair enforcer of the 
internal revenue laws.  
Just as it is wrong for the IRS to use partisan criteria in an 
unbalanced way to examine the application of social welfare organizations, 
so too is it wrong for the IRS to refuse to enforce provisions in the Code 
regulating tax-exempt entities. To the extent that tax-exempt organizations 
are abusing their tax exempt status or are circumventing congressional intent 
with regard to the disclosure of campaign contributions, lax enforcement by 
the IRS also impacts our confidence in the agency. Unfortunately, under 
enforcement or over enforcement may have a partisan bias if groups 
engaging in one type of activity or another are dominated by one ideology. 
Thus action and inaction may both be used for partisan advantage.   
Many have argued that the IRS is the wrong agency to enforce 
campaign-related restrictions and that the agency is not well suited to deal 
with these thorny political questions.
4
  In a previous article, I outlined what I 
referred to as “a quick repair to the regulatory plumbing” for campaign 
disclosure and tax-exempt entities.
5
 Some of these reforms may have reduced 
the likelihood of the current crisis, but it is now clear that patchwork 
solutions will just lead to another crisis. Congress needs to completely 
overhaul the current regime that regulates the political activity of tax-exempt 
organizations. These reforms should be designed to restore people’s faith in 
the nonpartisan enforcement of our internal revenue laws while also ensuring 
that tax-exempt entities are not circumventing laws designed to ensure that 
tax-exempt status is not abused. 
There are important policy justifications for regulating the political 
activity of tax-exempt organizations, but to the extent regulation and 
enforcement of laws related to the political activity of tax-exempt 
organizations is necessary, that enforcement should be assigned to an 
                                                                                                                             
REVIEW (May 14, 2013), www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2013reports/2013 
10053fr.pdf [hereinafter TREASURY INSPECTOR]. 
4. See Lloyd H. Mayer, The Much Maligned 527 and Institutional 
Choice, 87 B.U. L. REV. 625, 628 (2007) (“Congress should shift jurisdiction over 
the disclosure of political activity by 527s from the IRS to the FEC. . . . The IRS’s 
history of effectively enforcing tax classifications is suspect . . . .”); Ellen P. Aprill, 
Why the IRS Should Want to Develop Rules Regarding Charities and Politics, 62 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 643 (2012) (stating that the IRS has minimal resources to 
devote to auditing 501(c)(3)’s, the IRS’s Political Activity Compliance Initiative has 
“fizzled away,” and a large percentage of 501(c)(3)’s are unlikely to devote scarce 
resources to engage professionals to help interpret IRS standards). 
5. Donald Tobin, Campaign Disclosure and Tax-Exempt Entities: A 
Quick Repair to the Regulatory Plumbing, 10 ELECTION L.J. 427 (2011) [hereinafter 
Tobin, Campaign Disclosure].  
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independent entity that is structured to ensure nonpartisan enforcement of 
these rules. 
There is no simple fix for reforming the current regulatory regime. In 
order to restore confidence in the fair and equitable treatment of groups 
engaged in political activity, Congress must take a broad approach that 
reforms the statutory framework for regulating tax-exempt organizations, 
fixes a broken enforcement process, and provides for greater transparency for 
actions taken by the IRS. 
This Article explores the first step in the reform process, namely 
reform of the statutory framework regulating tax-exempt organizations 
involved in political campaign activity.
6
 The current statutory framework is 
completely broken. It encourages tax-exempt organizations to improperly 
engage in political campaign related activities without disclosing their 
donors. Under current law, political organizations are required to disclose 
their donors, but other tax-exempt organizations are not required to do so. 
The differential treatment with regard to donor disclosure that applies to 
political organizations versus other tax-exempt organizations encourages 
organizations to be very aggressive with regard to their view of what 
constitutes political intervention. In addition, entity-based regulation 
encourages groups to search for alternative entities that may allow the groups 
to avoid regulation.
7
 The regulatory structure thus needs to be reformed to 
rely less on entity-based regulation and more on a statutory structure that can 
be applied regardless of entity status. 
  Part II of this Article outlines the current regulatory environment 
facing tax-exempt entities that wish to engage in political activities. Part III 
discusses the current crisis, including the IRS’s actions and the abusive 
activities of tax-exempt organizations that caused many academics and 
politicians to call for better enforcement of the rules regarding political 
campaign intervention and tax-exempt entities. Part IV suggests reforms in 
                                                     
6. Because of taxpayer privacy rules, it is often difficult for even 
Congress to obtain information regarding audits, examinations, and treatment of tax-
exempt organizations. As a result of these privacy rules, it is difficult to determine 
how the rules surrounding the political activity of tax-exempt organizations are 
enforced, including whether they are enforced at all or whether they are being 
enforced in a partisan way. The public interest concerns that surround the secrecy of 
taxpayer information do not apply with the same force in the tax-exempt context, 
especially since much of this information is disclosed if an entity’s exempt status is 
approved.  Transparency in the decision making process increases public confidence 
that the regulations are being enforced in an even-handed and equitable manner. For 
an excellent recent discussion of this issue see George K. Yin, Saving the IRS, 100 
VA. LAW. REV. ONLINE 22 (April 2004).  Professor Daniel Tokaji and I will address 
the third necessary component of reform, reform of the enforcement process, in 
future work. 
7. Tobin, Political Advocacy, supra note 2. 
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the legal and regulatory rules governing tax-exempt entities. Practitioners 
have long been seeking clearer rules with regard to the political activity of 
tax-exempt organizations, and this crisis highlights that the current 
regulatory structure is flawed. 
 
II.  CURRENT REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT FACING  
TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 
 
Nearly all political campaign-related activities are engaged in by tax-
exempt organizations.
8
 The increased complexity of political campaigns 
necessarily increases the complexity of the rules regulating tax-exempt 
entities engaged in political campaigns. The increased activity and regulatory 
complexity puts the IRS in the unenviable position of having to make 
difficult determinations regarding the political activity of tax-exempt entities. 
This section explains the current regulatory environment facing tax-exempt 
entities and discusses how the current regulations are designed to create a 
coherent regulatory structure of tax-exempt entities.  
In general, the Code recognizes various organizations as tax-exempt 
because they do not have a profit motive, and often do not have “income” in 
the way that it is traditionally defined in the tax context.
9
 These organizations 
are deemed tax-exempt in that the income of the organization is exempt from 
tax. However, unlike public charities and religious organizations defined 
under section 501(c)(3), donations to other tax-exempt organizations are not 
deductible by the donor. Thus, section 501(c)(3) organizations receive 
special status—not only are the organizations’ income exempt from tax, but 
donations to the organizations are tax deductible. Other tax-exempt 
                                                     
8. Candidate committees are section 527 political organizations. 
Independent groups primarily engaged in campaign advocacy are supposed to be 
organized as section 527 political organizations. So called “super PACs” accept 
unlimited contributions and engage in activities that subject them to rules and 
regulations. After Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), 
corporations are now allowed to engage in independent advocacy on behalf of a 
candidate. In the 2012 cycle, it appears that corporations still mainly chose to direct 
contributions to independent third-party tax-exempt groups instead of engaging in 
direct advocacy. See OPENSECRETS.ORG, last accessed Mar. 11, 2014, 
www.opensecrets.org.   
9. The main revenue source for most tax-exempt organizations is donations 
to the organization. There is a real question whether these donations are income for 
tax purposes.  Daniel I. Halperin, Is Income Tax Exemption for Charities a Subsidy?, 
64 TAX L. REV. 283 (2011); Ellen P. Aprill, Regulating the Political Speech of 
Noncharitable Exempt Organizations After Citizens United, 10 ELECTION L.J. 363 
(2011) [hereinafter Aprill, Regulating the Political Speech]; Tobin, Political 
Advocacy, supra note 2, at 67. 
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organizations are exempt from tax on their income but contributions to the 
organizations are not tax deductible. 
 
A. Regulations of Section 501(c)(3) Religious Entities and Charities 
 
Section 501(c)(3) organizations are what most Americans identify as 
tax-exempt or non-profit organizations. These organizations are religious, 
educational, and charitable organizations that are formed for the public 
good.
10
 Contributions to section 501(c)(3) organizations are tax deductible by 
the donor, and organizations are not subject to tax on income that is related 
to the organization’s exempt purpose.11 Section 501(c)(3) organizations 
receive a dual tax benefit and these benefits, especially the deductibility of 
contributions by the donor, are generally considered a subsidy provided to 
the organizations by society. With the exception of religious entities, 
organizations seeking section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status must file a Form 
1023 and must be recognized by the IRS as a 501(c)(3) organization.
12
 
Congress determined that organizations wishing to receive this 
special status must meet certain statutory requirements. As a starting matter, 
the organizations must be organized for a charitable or religious purpose.
13
 
Section 501(c)(3) organizations are also prohibited from engaging in political 
                                                     
10. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (“Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or 
foundation, organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, 
testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or 
international amateur sports competition . . . or for the prevention of cruelty to 
children or animals.”) 
11. Income unrelated to an organization’s exempt purpose is subject to 
tax. I.R.C. § 511(b)(1). Charitable contributions are generally defined by section 
170(c) of the Code as, among other things, a donation to a ‘‘corporation, trust, or 
community chest, fund, or foundation . . . organized and operated exclusively for 
religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes or to foster national 
or international amateur sports competition (but only if no part of its activities 
involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of 
cruelty to children or animals.’’ I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(B). This definition closely 
parallels the definition for an exempt organization under section 501(c)(3) of the 
Code. Donations to section 501(c)(3) organizations are deductible by operation of 
section 170 of the Code. I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(D). 
12. I.R.C. § 508(c)(1)(a) (“[C]hurches, their integrated auxiliaries, and 
conventions or associations of churches” need not notify the Secretary that they are 
applying for recognition of Section 501(c)(3) status.). The term “church” applies to 
all religious institutions. 
13. Section 501(c)(3) provides that an organization must be “operated 
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or 
educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports 
competition (but only if no part of its activities involve the provision of athletic 
facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals . . . .” 
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campaigns on behalf of a candidate. Specifically, section 501(c)(3) prohibits 
an organization from “participat[ing] in, or intervene[ing] in (including the 
publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of 
(or in opposition to) any candidate for public office.”14 In addition, a section 
501(c)(3) organization may not engage in more than an insubstantial amount 
of lobbying.
15
 Finally, section 501(c)(3) organizations must be formed for the 
public benefit and not to support a private interest,
16
 and income generated 
by the organization may not inure to the benefit of any individual or 
shareholder.
17
 
These three restrictions—the prohibition on political intervention, 
the lobbying restriction, and the prohibition on private inurement—often 
require the IRS to investigate politically sensitive activities of an 
organization and to make decisions that have consequences on organizations 
involved in political activity. In addition, since a section 501(c)(3) 
organization may be an educational organization, the IRS must often 
determine whether an organization’s activities are in fact educational or are 
instead political intervention or lobbying. 
 
B. Regulation of Section 501(c)(4) Social Welfare Organizations, 
Section 501(c)(5) Labor Unions, Section 501(c)(6) Business 
Leagues, and Section 527 Political Organizations 
 
Social welfare organizations, labor unions, and business leagues 
[hereinafter SLB organizations or SLBs] are also tax-exempt entities, but 
donations to these organizations are not deductible by the donors. These 
organizations are allowed to engage in an unlimited amount of lobbying as 
long as it is related to the organizations’ exempt purpose, and may intervene 
in political campaigns as long as the primary purpose of the organizations is 
still consistent with the organizations’ exempt purpose (i.e., social welfare, 
labor, or promotion of business). 
 
  
                                                     
14. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). 
15. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (“no substantial part of the activities of which is 
carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation . . . .”). 
16. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii). In Am. Campaign Acad. v. 
Commissioner, 92 T.C. 1053 (1989), the Tax Court determined that an organization 
formed by Newt Gingrich was not entitled to exempt status because the organization 
was operated for a private benefit. The court determined that the organization was 
operated to assist Republican candidates. 
17. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). 
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1. Social Welfare Organizations (Section 501(c)(4) 
Organizations) 
 
Social welfare organizations are organizations that are not organized 
for profit but “operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare….18 
Although Congress used the word “exclusively” in the statute, a Regulation 
provides that an organization qualifies as a social welfare organization if “it 
is primarily engaged in promoting in some way the common good and 
general welfare of the people of the community.”19 Included within this 
definition is an organization “operated primarily for the purpose of bringing 
about civic betterments and social improvements.”20 Lobbying is considered 
a social welfare activity as long as the lobbying is related to the 
organization’s exempt purpose.21 Intervention in a political campaign, 
however, is not a social welfare purpose.
22
 Thus, to the extent that groups 
seek to engage in significant campaign-related activities, the groups do not 
qualify as social welfare organizations. Unlike section 501(c)(3) 
organizations, social welfare organizations are not required to file with the 
IRS seeking recognition of their exempt status.
23
 Social welfare 
organizations may seek recognition by filing a Form 1024, but such 
recognition is not required.
24
   
In addition, unlike political organizations, social welfare 
organizations are not required to publically disclose their donors. Social 
welfare organizations are required to disclose to the IRS donors who 
contribute $5,000 or more as part of the organization’s Form 990 Schedule B 
information return that the organization must file with the IRS.
25
 The 
Schedule B donor disclosures are not made public.
26
 
Because social welfare organizations must have social welfare as 
their primary purpose and because political intervention activities are not 
social welfare activities, the IRS is charged with determining whether a 
                                                     
18. I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) (“Civic leagues or organizations not organized for 
profit but operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare, or local 
associations of employees, the membership of which is limited to the employees of a 
designated person or persons in a particular municipality, and the net earnings of 
which are devoted exclusively to charitable, educational, or recreational purposes.”) 
19. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii). 
20. Id. 
21. See Rev. Rul. 2004-6, 2004-1 C.B. 328. 
22. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii). 
23. See Reg. § 1.6033-1(e) (Social welfare organizations can be 
“nondeclaring” social welfare organizations. Even if an organization does not file for 
recognition, it is required to file a Form 990 information return.). 
24. Id. 
25. I.R.C. § 6033(a); Reg. § 1.6033-2. 
26. Reg. § 301.6104(b)-1(b). 
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social welfare organization is in fact primarily engaged in social welfare. 
This once again requires the IRS to investigate the various activities of the 
organization.  In fact, the IRS’s inquiry is even more invasive in the section 
501(c)(4) context than for section 501(c)(3)’s because the IRS must have a 
full understanding of what a section 501(c)(4) is doing and how it operates in 
order to make a determination regarding an organization’s primary purpose. 
If an organization is engaged in political intervention activities, then the IRS 
must determine how pervasive those activities are within the organization, 
and then determine the organization’s primary purpose. 
In addition, just as with section 501(c)(3) organizations, section 
501(c)(4) social welfare organizations are prohibited from engaging either 
private inurement transactions or private benefit transactions.
27
 Thus, for 
example, the IRS has determined that an organization formed to promote 
women who are interested in running for public office as democrats was 
formed “primarily for the benefit of a political party and a private group of 
individuals, rather than the community as a whole.”28 
 
2. Labor Unions (Section 501(c)(5) Organizations) 
 
Labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations are exempt from 
tax under section 501(c)(5). The statute and regulations are vague regarding 
the definition of section 501(c)(5) organizations, but the regulations provide 
that they must “have as their objects the betterment of the conditions of those 
engaged in such pursuits, the improvement of the grade of their products, and 
the development of a high degree of efficiency in their respective 
occupations.”29 Unlike the statute and regulations defining social welfare 
organizations, the statute and regulations for labor organizations do not 
indicate the extent of the organization’s activity that must be for the exempt 
purpose. In a General Counsel Memorandum (GCM), the IRS indicated that, 
in order to qualify for exempt status, section 501(c)(5) organizations must be 
primarily engaged in the exempt activity, here labor, agricultural, or 
horticultural activities, and that intervention in a political campaign is not a 
                                                     
27. I.R.C. § 501(c)(4)(B). 
28. LETTER DENYING TAX-EXEMPT STATUS (April 4, 2011). A redacted 
version of the letter has been posted on the IRS’s website, 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/1128032.pdf (last visited Mar. 11, 2014). The Group 
was later identified as Emerge American, an organization that supports democratic 
women interested in running for office. See Stephanie Strom, 3 Groups Denied 
Break by the IRS Are Named, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2011; Stephanie Strom, Political 
Advocacy Groups Denied Tax-Exempt Status, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2011. See also 
Am. Campaign Acad. v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 1053 (1989) (denying an 
organization tax-exempt status because it served a private benefit of helping 
republican candidates). 
29. Reg. § 1.501(c)(5)-1. 
440 Florida Tax Review  [Vol. 16:8  
 
labor, agricultural, or horticultural activity.
30
 Thus, just like section 501(c)(4) 
organizations, labor unions may intervene in a political campaign for or 
against a candidate for public office, but the primary purpose of the 
organization must remain labor, agricultural, or horticultural. Although the 
GCM does not carry the force of law, its conclusion is consistent with the 
statutory framework. If the organization’s primary purpose is intervention in 
a political campaign, then the organization should be classified as a section 
527 political organization and not as a section 501(c)(5) organization.
31
 
Contributions to section 501(c)(5) organizations are not deductible 
by donors as charitable contributions. Also, an organization does not qualify 
for exemption under section 501(c)(5) if any of its net earnings inures to the 
benefit of any member.
32
 In addition, like other tax-exempt organizations, 
labor organizations are required to file a Form 990 information return, which 
among other things, requires the organization to disclose to the IRS donors 
who contribute $5,000 or more.
33
 
Section 501(c)(5) organizations are also not required under the Code 
to publically disclose their donors, but labor unions are required to make 
certain donor disclosures to the Department of Labor.
34
 Labor unions must 
file an information report, copies of their constitution and bylaws, and annual 
financial reports with the Office of Labor-Management Standards of the U.S. 
Department of Labor.
35
 Labor organizations must also disclose the identity of 
any contributor giving in aggregate $5,000 or more in a 12 month reporting 
period, as well as the purpose, date, and amount of the contribution to the 
Department of Labor.
36
 
 
3. Business Leagues, Chambers of Commerce, Boards of Trade 
(Section 501(c)(6) Organizations) 
 
Business organizations are exempt from tax under section 501(c)(6) 
of the Code. The regulations define a business league as a group organized to 
                                                     
30. G.C.M. 34,233 (Dec. 3, 1969). 
31. The term “political organization” means a party, committee, 
association, fund, or other organization (whether or not incorporated) organized and 
operated primarily for the purpose of directly or indirectly accepting contributions or 
making expenditures, or both, for an exempt function. I.R.C. § 527(e)(1). 
32. I.R.C. § 501(c)(5). 
33. I.R.C. § 6033(a); Reg. § 1.6033-2. 
34. 29 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. 
35. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA), 
(as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 401 et seq.); 29 C.F.R. pts. 401–453. 
36. 29 U.S.C. § 431; 29 C.F.R. § 403. See Dep’t of Labor, Form LM-2. 
For a thorough discussion of the requirement see Labor Organization Annual 
Financial Reports, 68 Fed. Reg. 58,374, 58,388–89, 58,430 (Oct. 9, 2003) (to be 
codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 403, 408).  
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promote common business interests.
37
 The organization may not be engaged 
in a business activity that is normally carried on for profit, and the benefits of 
the organization must not inure to the benefit of an individual or 
shareholder.
38
 Its activities should be similar to a chamber of commerce or a 
board of trade and should be directed to the improvement of business 
conditions.
39
 
As with labor organizations, the statute and regulations do not 
specifically indicate the percentage of the organization’s activity that must be 
for the exempt purpose. In GCM 34233, the IRS indicated that “support of a 
candidate for public office necessarily involves the organization in the total 
political attitudes and positions of the candidates.” The IRS concluded that 
“political action” is therefore not part of a business league’s exempt activity, 
and that an organization that is primarily involved in political action does not 
qualify as a business league.
40
 In addition, if the organization’s primary 
purpose was intervention in a political campaign, then the organization 
would likely be classified as a section 527 political organization and not as a 
section 501(c)(6) organization. 
Just as with social welfare organizations, section 501(c)(6) 
organizations are not required to publicly disclose donors, but like other tax-
exempt organizations, business leagues must file Form 990 and disclose 
donors of $5,000 and more to the IRS.
41
 These disclosures, however, are not 
released to the public. 
 
4. Section 527 Political Organization 
 
A political organization is an organization whose primary purpose is 
to influence elections.
42
 Specifically, a political organization is an 
organization “operated primarily for the purpose of directly or indirectly 
accepting contributions or making expenditures” to influence the “selection, 
nomination, election, or appointment of any individual to any Federal, State 
or local public office . . . .”43 
The tax treatment of political organizations under section 527 is 
similar to that of social welfare organizations, labor unions, and business 
leagues. The income of political organizations is generally exempt from 
tax,
44
 but unlike other tax-exempt organizations, political organizations 
                                                     
37. Reg. § 1.501(c)(6)-1. 
38. Id. 
39. Reg. § 1.501(c)(6)-1. 
40. G.C.M. 34, 233 (Dec. 3, 1969). 
41. I.R.C. § 6033(a); Reg. § 1.6033-2. 
42. I.R.C. § 527(e)(1). 
43. Reg. § 1.527-2(a). 
44. Section 527 exempts a political organization from tax by providing 
that amounts spent for an “exempt function” are not subject to tax. “Exempt 
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wishing to remain exempt from tax must publicly disclose the source of 
contributions in excess of $200 and the recipients of expenditures in excess 
of $500.
45
 If a section 527 organization chooses not to comply with the 
disclosure provisions in section 527, then its income, which includes 
contributions to the organization, is subject to tax at the highest corporate 
rate.
46
 
An organization seeking status as a section 527 political organization 
acknowledges that its primary purpose is intervening in elections, and there 
is therefore very little need for the IRS to investigate the political activities of 
these organizations.
47
 The IRS would still need to determine if the 
organization met the other requirements entitling the organization to tax-
exempt status and theoretically it would need to ensure that the organization 
is actually engaged in political activity. In practice, however, because 
obtaining section 527 political organization status is more onerous than 
social welfare status, groups only seek section 527 status when their activity 
clearly involves intervention in a political campaign, so abuse in this area is 
very unlikely. 
The IRS would have to determine whether an organization claiming 
to be exempt under another provision of section 501(c) was in fact a section 
527 political organization, but it is unlikely that the IRS will need to examine 
the political activity of a section 527 political organization to determine if it 
meets the requirements of section 527.
48
  
  
                                                                                                                             
function” is defined as “the function of influencing or attempting to influence the 
selection, nomination, election, or appointment of any individual to [public office].” 
I.R.C. § 527(e)(2). 
45. I.R.C. § 527(j)(1), (j)(3)(A)–(B). 
46. Under I.R.C. § 527(b)(1), an organization that fails to file with the 
Secretary and disclose contributions and expenditures is taxed at the highest 
corporate tax rate, currently 35 percent. If an organization files with the Secretary 
and fails to disclose a particular contribution or expenditures, then the organization 
must pay tax at the 35 percent on the amount that the organization failed to disclose. 
See I.R.C. § 527(i)(4), (j)(1).   
47. See Edward B. Foley & Donald Tobin, Tax Code Section 527 Groups 
Not an End-Run Around McCain-Feingold, 72  U.S.L. WK. 2403, 2404–05 (2004). 
48. Section 527 is designed to be non-elective in that an organization is a 
section 527 organization if it meets the definition contained in section 527. See Nat’l 
Fed’n of Republican Assemblies v. United States, 148 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1282 (S.D. 
Ala. 2001); Nat’l Fed’n of Republican Assemblies v. United States, 218 F. Supp. 2d 
1300, 1308 n.7. (S.D. Ala. 2002); Field Serv. Adv. 200037040 (indicating that 
section 527 is not an elective provision); Rev. Rul. 2003-49, 2003-1 C.B. 903 
(Answer 20: indicating that an organization is subject to 527 if it meets the definition 
of political organization in section 527(e).). 
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C. The Current Statutory Structure Requires The IRS to Make Decisions 
That Have Political Ramifications 
 
Although on its face the IRS examining the political beliefs and 
activities of organizations is antithetical to the proper role of the IRS, there 
are several reasons why under the current statutory structure the IRS is 
required to examine an organization’s political activity or to make decisions 
about an organization that have political ramifications. With regard to 
religious organizations and charities organized under section 501(c)(3), the 
deductibility of donor contributions makes it far more advantageous for 
entities to organize as charitable or religious organizations under section 
501(c)(3) than under other provisions for other tax-exempt entities. As part 
of the condition of the preferential tax-exempt status, tax-exempt section 
501(c)(3) organizations are prohibited from intervening in a political 
campaign or in engaging in more than an insubstantial amount of lobbying.
49
 
Organizations are also prohibited from organizing for the “private benefit” of 
individuals or a group of individuals, and the benefits of the organization 
may not inure to an individual or a group of individuals.
50
 In addition, many 
organizations claim exemption under section 501(c)(3) as educational 
organizations. There is a fine line between activities that are educational for 
section 501(c)(3) charity status, and activities that are in fact political 
activities.
51
 After all, it is easy to argue that a political advertisement is 
designed to educate the populace on issues. The IRS is charged with ensuring 
that organizations do, in fact, qualify for section 501(c)(3) status and 
examinations of an organization’s tax-exempt status may require the IRS to 
make sensitive judgments regarding an organization’s political activity.52 
With regard to the political activities of other tax-exempt 
organizations, the IRS is charged with regulating the dividing line between 
political organizations regulated under section 527 and other exempt-
organizations that may engage in some political campaign activity but must 
                                                     
49. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). 
50. Id. 
51. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(i) (An organization may be educational 
even though it advocates a particular position or viewpoint so long as it presents a 
sufficiently full and fair exposition of the pertinent facts as to permit an individual or 
the public to form an independent opinion or conclusion.); Daniel L. Simmons, An 
Essay on Federal Income Taxation and Campaign Finance Reform, 54 FLA. L. REV. 
1, 58 (2002) [hereinafter Simmons, Campaign Finance Reform] (“The distinction 
between nonpartisan education on a broad range of issues, and biased education 
intended to influence the outcome of an election is anything but clear.”).   
52. See also Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. v. Commissioner, 858 
F.2d 876, 877 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that the bar association’s ranking of judicial 
candidates violated the ban on “political activity”); Rev. Rul. 78-248, 1978-1 C.B. 
154; Rev. Rul. 80-282, 1980-2 C.B. 178; Rev. Proc. 86-43, 1986-2 C.B. 729. 
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primarily engage in activities consistent with their exempt purpose. Section 
527 political organizations are required to either disclose contributions and 
expenditures or pay a tax. Organizations have sought to avoid the disclosure 
provisions that are applicable to political organizations by organizing as tax-
exempt entities under another provision of the Code—usually as section 
501(c)(4) social welfare organizations, section 501(c)(5) labor unions, or 
section 501(c)(6) business leagues. These tax-exempt organizations are 
allowed to intervene in political campaigns but the primary purpose of these 
organizations may not be political campaign activity and must be consistent 
with their exempt status. The IRS is therefore charged with examining 
whether a tax-exempt organization is engaged in significant campaign 
activity to determine whether the organization must be regulated as a section 
527 political organization and thereby be subject to the disclosure provisions 
in section 527.   
  The IRS’s primary role in this regulatory structure is to ensure that (1) 
only religious and charitable organizations that meet the requirements in 
section 501(c)(3) receive the tax subsidy of allowing donors to deduct 
contributions, and (2) organizations that engage in political advocacy as their 
primary function comply with the disclosure provisions in the Code that 
apply to political organizations. As the Code is currently structured, these 
provisions require the IRS to either inquire into the political activities of tax-
exempt organizations or avoid enforcement of these provisions and thereby 
be in dereliction of its duties to enforce provisions of the Code. 
 
1. The Use of a “Primary Purpose” Standard Encourages   
  Abuse by Organizations and Raises Concerns of  Manipulation 
  by the IRS 
 
Although section 501(c)(4) provides that an organization must be 
operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare, a Regulation only 
requires that the organization be “primarily engaged in promoting in some 
way the common good and general welfare of the people of the 
community.”53 Thus, under the existing rules, SLBs are allowed to engage in 
some amount of campaign intervention, but the organizations must still 
primarily engage in activities related to their exempt function. Regulations 
and IRS decisions indicate that intervention in a political campaign is not 
consistent with a section 501(c) SLB’s exempt purpose and is therefore not 
counted for purposes of determining a group’s primary activity.54 Current 
law, however, is unclear regarding how much campaign-related activities an 
organization may engage in and still be considered primarily engaged in 
activity related to its exempt purpose. Some practitioners argue that the word 
                                                     
53. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(i). 
54. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1; G.C.M. 34, 233 (Dec. 3, 1969). 
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“primary” in the regulation only requires that more than half of the group’s 
expenditures be consistent with its exempt purpose.
55
 Others argue that the 
Code’s interpretation of “primary” is far more limited and only allows an 
insubstantial amount of the non-primary activity.
56
 The IRS has not released 
guidance
57 
indicating how much extraneous activity an organization may 
engage in while maintaining its exemption.
58
 
                                                     
55. See Comments of the Individual Members of the Exempt 
Organizations Committee’s Task Force on Section 501(c)(4) and Politics, 
AMERICANBAR.ORG 9, May 25, 2004, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ 
migrated/tax/pubpolicy /2004/040525exo.authcheckdam.pdf; Aprill, Regulating the 
Political Speech, supra note 9, at 382 (citing academic support for a fifty percent 
threshold, the ABA Tax Section recommendation of a “40 percent safe harbor,” and 
a proposed sliding scale approach); Trevor Potter & Bryson B. Morgan, The History 
of Undisclosed Spending in U.S. Elections & How 2012 Became the “Dark Money” 
Election, 27 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 383, 465 (2013) (recognizing 
that some practitioners argue for a 50 percent threshold). 
56. Petition for IRS Rulemaking Submitted by Democracy 21 and the 
Campaign Legal Center, DEMOCRACY21.ORG, July 27, 2011, http://www.democracy 
21.org/uploads/D21_and_CLC_Petition_to_IRS_7_27_2011.pdf. 
57. Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue Daniel Werfel, Charting a 
Path Forward at the IRS: Initial Assessment and Plan of Action, IRS.GOV 25, June 
24, 2013, http://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/Initial%20Assessment%20and%20Plan  
%20of%20Action.pdf. In his report, Commissioner Werfel explained a new safe 
harbor that was set up to deal with tax-exempt groups whose applications were 
delayed. The safe harbor requires groups to certify that no more than 40 percent of 
their activities were campaign intervention and that more than 60 percent of their 
activities were for social welfare. Members of the ABA Tax Section made a similar 
proposal in 2004. See Comments of the Individual Members, supra note 55, at 9. In a 
presentation on this issue, the then Director of the IRS’s Exempt Organizations 
Division indicated “[w]hen it comes to political activities, that is, giving money to a 
candidate, telling people to vote for a certain candidate, the rule is that it has to be 
less than primary. If it’s 49 percent of their income, that is less than primary.” 
Marcus Owens, Practicing Law Institute Program on Corporate Political Activities, 
3 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 471 (June 1990). See also Lindsey McPherson, EO 
Training Materials Suggest 51 Percent Threshold for Social Welfare Activity, 142 
TAX NOTES 394 (Jan. 27, 2014). 
58. In Better Bus. Bureau v. United States, 326 U.S. 279, 283 (1945), the 
Court explained that a single non-exempt purpose, if substantial, would disqualify an 
organization from exemption. Some courts appear to have applied that standard in 
the section 501(c)(4) context,  see Contracting Plumbers Coop. Restoration Corp. v. 
United States, 488 F.2d 684 (2d Cir. 1973). In Contracting Plumbers Cooperative, 
however, the holding relies more on the fact that the activity was not for the common 
good but was for the benefit of the particular members of the cooperative. Id. at 687. 
The IRS has not followed this approach. See IRM 7.25.4.6 (“Since the test for 
exemption under IRC 501(c)(4) is one of primary activities, an organization exempt 
under IRC 501(c)(4) may engage in substantial non-exempt activities.”). 
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The regulations at issue were promulgated in 1959, and regulations 
governing sections 501(c)(3) and (c)(4) organizations were promulgated on 
the same day.
59
 The regulations governing section 501(c)(3) also deal with 
the word “exclusively,” and at times define “exclusively” as “primarily.” The 
section 501(c)(3) regulations, however, more clearly define “primarily” to 
allow only an insubstantial amount of non-exempt activity. In a number of 
subsections, the regulations define “exclusively” to be “not more than an 
insubstantial amount of a certain activity.”60 The regulations also indicate 
that “[a]n organization will be regarded as ‘operated exclusively’ for [an 
exempt purpose] only if it engaged primarily in [activities consistent with the 
exempt purpose].”61 The regulations have also indicated that an organization 
will not qualify for exemption if more than an “insubstantial part of its 
activities is not in furtherance of an exempt purpose.”62 Accordingly, in the 
section 501(c)(3) context, the move from “exclusively” to “primarily” only 
allows an organization to engage in an insubstantial amount of the non-
exempt activity. The regulations governing social welfare organizations, and 
the IRS determinations governing labor unions and business leagues, 
however, provide very little guidance regarding whether “primarily” in the 
section 501(c) SLB context should also be read to allow only an insubstantial 
amount of non-exempt activity.
63
 
In fact, in 2013, the Treasury released a new proposed rule clarifying 
the extent to which social welfare organizations may engage in political 
activity. The regulation does not address the primary purpose standard but 
instead requests comment with regard to what amount of non-exempt social 
welfare activity is appropriate.
64
 
Some commentators have argued that, in the section 501(c) SLB 
context, the regulation defining “exclusively” as “primarily” is necessary to 
                                                     
59. 24 Fed. Reg. 5217–19 (June 26, 1959); Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1; Reg. § 
1.501(c)(4)-1. 
60. See Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(1)(iii) (defining exclusively as not carrying 
on an insubstantial part of its activities; an organization is not organized exclusively 
for one or more exempt purposes if its articles expressly empower it to carry on, 
otherwise than as an insubstantial part of its activities, activities which are not in 
furtherance of one or more exempt purposes”); Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c) (An 
organization will not be regarded as being operated for an exempt purpose “if more 
than an insubstantial part of its activities is not in furtherance of an exempt 
purpose.”). 
61. Reg. 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1). 
62. Id. 
63. Petition for IRS Rulemaking, supra note 56 at 15. 
64. Guidance for Tax-Exempt Social Welfare Organizations on Candidate-
Related Political Activities, 78 Fed. Reg. 71535 (proposed Nov. 29, 2013) (to be 
codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
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cover unrelated business income tax activities of various organizations.
65
 
Others have noted that if “exclusively” is interpreted literally, then there is 
no organizational category for hybrid organizations that engage in some 
political advocacy and social welfare activity (or some other exempt 
activity), or for that matter an organization that engages in some activity that 
would qualify as social welfare and some activity that would qualify as a 
business league.
66
 Because social welfare organizations, labor unions, 
business leagues, and political organizations are all tax-exempt, a coherent 
regulatory structure would allow an organization to engage in both tax-
exempt non-political activity and tax-exempt political activity.
67
  
Unfortunately, there is no guidance from the IRS regarding how 
much campaign intervention is permissible, and it is unclear if the IRS has 
determined what standard it uses in evaluating whether an organization is 
engaged in permissible activities. If the IRS has not determined the definition 
of “primarily,” even internally, then it is extremely difficult for the IRS to 
determine whether an organization is operating “primarily” for an exempt 
purpose. These unclear standards increase the likelihood that the IRS will be 
accused of being politically motivated whenever it reaches a decision 
regarding whether an organization is “primarily” engaged in social welfare 
activities. 
 
  
                                                     
65. I.R.C. §§ 511, 512. Brian Galle, Roger Colinvaux, and Ellen Aprill 
have pointed out that the primary language was also likely used to recognize that 
organizations might engage in UBIT transactions that were not related to the 
organizations exempt function—except to the extent that revenue from the activities 
supported the organization’s exempt purpose. See Roger Colinvaux, Political 
Activity Limits and Tax Exemption: A Gordian’s Knot, (forthcoming Virginia Tax 
Review), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2476435; Ellen P. Aprill, The IRS’s Tea Party Tax 
Row: How “Exclusively” Became “Primarily,” Pacific Standard, The Science of 
Society (June 7, 2013), http://www.psmag.com/navigation/politics-and-law/the-
irss-tea-party-row-how-exclusively-became-primarily-59451. See also Comments of 
the Individual Members, supra note 55, at 38, n.80. 
66. Tobin, Campaign Disclosure, supra note 5. 
67. This justification is post-hoc in that the regulations were issued in 
1959, and at the time there was no official organizational form for political 
organizations. The IRS had simply been treating political organizations as tax-
exempt entities, presumably under the theory that the organizations had no income. 
Donald B. Tobin, Anonymous Speech and Section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code, 
37 GA. L. REV. 611, 620 (2003) [hereinafter Tobin, Anonymous Speech]. 
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2. Facts and Circumstances Test for Determining What 
Constitutes “Intervention in a Political Campaign” 
Encourages Abuse by Organizations and Raises Concerns 
 of Manipulation by the IRS 
 
Section 501(c) SLBs may engage in some political campaign 
activity, but the primary activity of the organization must be consistent with 
its exempt purpose, and section 527 organizations must be primarily engaged 
in campaign activity. Unlike under federal election law, there is not a bright-
line test for whether an activity is considered intervention in a political 
campaign. The express advocacy standard from Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 
(1976), does not apply. Instead, the IRS uses a facts and circumstances test to 
determine whether an activity is improper intervention in a political 
campaign. 
 
a. Facts and Circumstances Test 
 
Unlike in the election law context, in the tax context, the IRS uses a 
facts and circumstances test to determine whether an organization’s 
particular communication or activity is “intervention in a political 
campaign.” The IRS basically uses the same political intervention test for all 
section 501(c) organizations.
68
 If it is “intervention in a political campaign,” 
then a section 501(c)(3) may not engage in the activity and section 501(c) 
SLBs cannot count the activity as part of the groups primary purpose. There 
                                                     
68. In general, the IRS applies the same test in determining whether an 
activity is political intervention for purposes of determining the prohibition under 
section 501(c)(3) and primary purpose for other exempt organizations. See P.L.R. 
1998-08-037 (Feb. 20, 1998) (It follows that any activities constituting prohibited 
political intervention by a section 501(c)(3) organization are activities that must be 
less than the primary activities of a section 501(c)(4) organization, which are, in 
turn, activities that are exempt functions for a section 527 organization.”). See also 
Elizabeth J. Kingsley, Challenges to ‘Facts and Circumstances’—a Standard Whose 
Time has Passed?, 20 TAX’N OF EXEMPTS 43, at nn.7–9 (Mar./Apr. 2010) 
[hereinafter Kinglsey, Whose Time has Passed?] (citing Rev. Rul. 81-95, 1981-1 
C.B. 332, Rev. Rul. 2004-6, 2004-1 C.B. 328, and P.L.R. 1996-52-026 (Dec. 27, 
1996)). The IRS has indicated that, in some circumstances, activities that would not 
be political intervention in the 501(c) context might be exempt function activity for 
purposes of section 527 when the activity is closely tied to election related activities. 
These were taxpayer favorable rulings sought by section 527 organizations. The IRS 
concluded that education, issue advocacy, and grassroots lobbying that is 
“inextricably linked to the political process” would be exempt function activity. See 
P.L.R. 1999-25-051 (June 25, 1999). See also G.C.M. 39,694 (Feb. 1, 1988) (a 
section 501(c)(3) organization could seek to influence the appointment of a federal 
judge because that is not an elective office, but seeking to influence the appointment 
of a federal judge is also a section 527 exempt function activity.) 
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have been very few cases analyzing the test, but the IRS has released several 
rulings and announcements describing it.
69
 The IRS indicated that “political 
campaign intervention includes any and all activities that favor or oppose one 
or more candidates for public office.”70 These activities can include more 
classic campaign activities that are regulated by the Federal Election 
Commission under the Federal Election Campaign Act, like engaging in 
express advocacy
71
 or electioneering communication,
72
 but may also include 
indirect methods such as influencing elections through the distribution of 
biased or partisan literature.
73
 For example, political intervention in the 
section 501(c) context includes engaging in partisan voter registration drives, 
hosting candidates at forums and conventions without providing equal access 
to other candidates, or attending fundraisers for specific candidates.
74
 
Members of organizations may act politically in their individual capacity, but 
they may not do so on behalf of the organization. 
Section 501(c)(3) organizations may engage in issue advocacy, 
either as part of the limited allowance for lobbying or as part of the 
educational mission of the organization. Determining whether advocacy is 
issue advocacy or intervention in a political campaign is one of the major 
instances where the IRS must investigate the political activity of 
organizations. 
Revenue Ruling 2007-41 makes clear that section 501(c) 
organizations may take positions on public issues, including issues that 
divide candidates, but that intervention in a political campaign includes “. . . 
issue advocacy that functions as political campaign intervention. Even if a 
statement does not expressly tell an audience to vote for or against a specific 
candidate, an organization delivering the statement is at risk of violating the 
political campaign intervention prohibition if there is any message favoring 
or opposing a candidate.”75 
In determining whether a communication is issue advocacy or 
political intervention, key factors include:  
 
1) whether the statement identifies one or more candidates 
for a given public office; 2) whether the statement expresses 
approval or disapproval for one or more candidates’ 
                                                     
69. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 2007-41; F.S. 2006-17. 
70. F.S. 2006-17. 
71. See infra notes 90–92. 
72. Electioneering communication is defined as “broadcast, cable, or 
satellite communication which . . . refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal 
office . . .” and is made within sixty days of a general election or thirty days before a 
primary. 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A) (2007). 
73. Rev. Rul. 78-248, 1978-1 C.B.154. 
74. Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1421. 
75. Id. 
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positions and/or actions; 3) whether the statement is 
delivered close in time to the election; 4) whether the issue 
addressed in the communication has been raised as an issue 
distinguishing candidates for a given office; 5) whether the 
communication is part of an ongoing series of 
communications by the organization on the same issue that 
are made independent of the timing of any election; and 6) 
whether the timing of the communication and identification 
of the candidate are related to a non-electoral event such as a 
scheduled vote on specific legislation by an officeholder 
who also happens to be a candidate for  public office.
76
  
  
The IRS explains “communication is particularly at risk of political 
campaign intervention when it makes reference to candidates or voting in a 
specific upcoming election.”77  
Facts and circumstances tests are common in tax enforcement. The 
political intervention test has the major advantage of not being a bright-line 
test. Bright-line tests in election law have allowed groups to use technical 
compliance to circumvent the intent of election rules.
78
 The test requires the 
IRS to examine the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the 
communication is political campaign intervention or issue advocacy. The 
test, however, makes it difficult on the edges for organizations to know 
whether their communication is permissible issue advocacy or impermissible 
political campaign activity. Especially in the section 501(c)(3) context, 
uncertainty is problematic because even a limited amount of campaign 
activity may put an organization’s status in jeopardy.79 
The facts and circumstances test also necessarily requires the IRS to 
examine the activities of an organization to determine whether the activities 
                                                     
76. Id.  
77. Id. 
78. See infra note 94. 
79. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 501(c)(3); Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(3); I.R.S. 
PUBLICATION 1828, TAX GUIDE FOR CHURCHES AND RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS: 
BENEFITS AND RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THE FEDERAL TAX LAW 7 (2012) (“[A]ll 
IRC section 501(c)(3) organizations, including churches and religious organizations, 
are absolutely prohibited from directly or indirectly participating in, or intervening 
in, any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for 
elective public office.”); STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, DESCRIPTION OF 
PRESENT LAW RELATING TO SECTION 501(C)(3) ORGANIZATIONS AND SUMMARY OF 
SECTION 501(C)(3)-RELATED PROVISIONS OF THE PENSION PROTECTION ACT OF 2006 
AND PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS, (JCX-53-07), July 19, 2007, at 6. In 
addition to, or instead of, revocation, the Code provides for an excise tax on political 
expenditures, assessment of taxes due, and an injunction against further activity. See 
I.R.C. §§ 4955, 6852, 7409. 
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amount to intervention in a political campaign. This may require the IRS to 
examine an organization’s publications, its communications, its website, and 
even sermons by religious leaders.
80
 
 
b. The IRS’s New Proposed Regulation Creates A 
Bright-Line Test and Replaces the Facts and 
Circumstances Test for  Determining Intervention  
 in a Political Campaign 
 
The Treasury has recently issued proposed regulations that suggest a 
bright-line test that will eliminate much of the uncertainty that currently 
exists with regard to what constitutes political activity. The proposed rule 
produced over 150,000 comments, and the IRS recently announced that it 
would propose a revised rule after considering the comments it received.
81
 
The proposed rule, however, is very instructive and provides interesting 
insights into possible reforms in this area.
82
 
                                                     
80. Each year in September, the Alliance Defense Fund (ADF) organizes 
“Pulpit Freedom Sunday” where it encourages religious leaders to endorse 
candidates to the pulpit. ADF hopes to create a test case with regard to a religious 
leader’s right to endorse a candidate from the pulpit. To date, the author is not aware 
of any actions by the IRS with regard to religious leaders who participate in the 
pulpit initiative. See The Pulpit Initiative Executive Summary, 
ALLIANCEDEFENDINGFREEDOM.ORG, last accessed Dec. 23, 2009, http://adfwebad 
min.com/userfiles/file/Pulpit_Initiative_executive_summary_candidates%203_11_1
0.pdf. Under current law, it is clear that a religious entity organized under section 
501(c)(3) is not entitled to endorse a candidate. In order to enforce this prohibition 
and determine whether an organization has improperly endorsed a candidate, the IRS 
has examined the text of sermons given by religious leaders. See infra notes 86–88. 
See also Allan J. Samansky, Deductibility of Contributions to Religious Institutions, 
24 VA. TAX REV. 65, 67 (2004). 
81. The IRS noted on its website that it received over 150,000 written 
comments and that “[c]onsistent with what Commissioner Koskinen has previously 
stated, it is likely that we will make some changes to the proposed regulation in light 
of the comments we have received. Given the diversity of views expressed and the 
volume of substantive input, we have concluded that it would be more efficient and 
useful to hold a public hearing after we publish the revised proposed regulation.” 
IRS.GOV, last visited June 22, 2014, http://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/IRS-Update-
on-the-Proposed-New-Regulation-on-501(c)(4)-Organizations. 
82. An analysis of the rule is outside the scope of this article. For a 
comment generally supporting the rule, see Brian D. Galle & Donald B. Tobin, 
Comments on Guidance for Tax-Exempt Social Welfare Organizations on 
Candidate-Related Political Activities (Ohio State Pub. Law Working Paper No. 
239, Bos. Coll. Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 321), http://papers.ssrn. 
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2399315. 
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Under the proposed regulation, the facts and circumstances test 
remains for determining a group’s primary purpose, but a new test, one 
relying on what the regulation refers to as “candidate-related political 
advocacy,” is used for determining whether an activity is consistent with an 
organization’s social welfare purpose.83 If an activity is considered 
“candidate-related political advocacy,” then it does not have a social welfare 
purpose. By clearly defining “candidate-related political advocacy,” the 
Treasury has proposed a bright-line test that will significantly decrease the 
confusion and gamesmanship regarding the permissible activities of social 
welfare organizations.  
The proposed regulation defines “candidate-related political 
advocacy” to include communications similar to express advocacy under 
election law, including communication expressing a view on a candidate and 
containing words like “vote,” “support,” or “reject,” or is communication 
susceptible to no other interpretation.
84
 The regulation also categorizes as 
“candidate-related political advocacy” communication similar to 
electioneering communication under election law, classifying all 
communication that refers to a clearly identified candidate within 30 days of 
a primary or 60 days of a general election as candidate related 
communication.
85
 
These first two components of the regulation would likely not have 
been that controversial. The regulation, however, also defines quasi-political 
activity, like get-out-the-vote operations and voter registration drives as 
“candidate-related political activity.” The regulation also counts as 
campaign-related political activity the hosting or conducting an event within 
30 days of a primary election or within 60 days of general election at which 
one or more candidates appear. Because the regulation was designed to 
create bright-line rules, there is no exception for nonpartisan candidate 
appearances, get-out-the-vote drives, or voter registration drives.  
Although these activities are, at times, conducted in a nonpartisan 
manner, they are also often candidate-related. The proposed regulations thus 
create what at first looks like a conflict between the section 501(c)(3) and 
section 501(c)(4) rules. Under the proposed regulation, if these activities are 
conducted by a section 501(c)(3) organization in a nonpartisan manner, then 
they would be permitted because they would not be considered intervention 
in a political campaign, but if this same activity was engaged in by social 
welfare organizations, it would be considered “candidate-related political 
activity.” 
Although the IRS has indicated that it will propose a revised rule, the 
bright-line rule has the advantage of clearly identifying what activity is 
                                                     
83. Prop. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1, 78 Fed. Reg. 71,535 (2013). 
84. Id. 
85. Id. 
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“candidate-related political activity” and thus not social welfare activity. 
Since social welfare organizations may engage in a certain amount of 
“candidate-related political activity,” the broad bright-line rule is workable. 
In addition, if groups engage in a significant amount of nonpartisan activity 
that is considered candidate-related in the social welfare context, then groups 
can simply create a tax-exempt charitable affiliate to engage in that activity. 
The fact that there is a better tax-exempt alternative for this type of 
communication indicates that SLBs are really not interested in engaging in 
nonpartisan get-out-the-vote drives and voter registration drives. If they 
wanted to engage in significant nonpartisan activity, then they could organize 
as section 501(c)(3) organization and receive tax deductible contributions. 
 
D. Entity Manipulation and FEC Action Have Allowed Organizations to 
Circumvent Congressional Intent With Regard to Disclosure 
 
Prior to 2000 when Congress added the requirements regarding 
donor and entity disclosure to section 527, the major tax regulatory 
difference between various tax-exempt organizations was whether the 
organizations were exempt under section 501(c)(3) or whether they were 
exempt under another provision of the Code. Organizations preferred section 
501(c)(3) status because contributions were deductible by the donor, so 
organizations had an incentive to classify political campaign activity as a 
permissible section 501(c)(3) activity, such as education or lobbying. Since 
section 501(c)(3) organizations are completely prohibited from intervening 
in political campaigns, and are only allowed to engage in an insubstantial 
amount of lobbying, the IRS was charged with monitoring the political 
activity of organizations seeking exempt status.  At times the IRS’s efforts to 
investigate the political activity of section 501(c)(3)’s caused organizations 
to complain that they were being targeted for political reasons.
86
 In addition, 
members of Congress questioned whether the IRS was improperly 
investigating organizations because of an organization’s political beliefs.87 
When examining section 501(c)(3) organizations, however, the IRS only 
                                                     
86. See Michael Janofsky, Citing July Speech, I.R.S. Decides to Review 
N.A.A.C.P., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2004 (Julian Bond, Chairman of the NAACP, 
responding to the New York Times: “This is an attempt to silence the N.A.A.C.P. on 
the very eve of a presidential election . . . Clearly, someone in the I.R.S. doesn’t 
want that to happen.”); Rebecca Trounson, IRS Ends Church Probe But Stirs New 
Questions, L.A. TIMES, September 24, 2007 (quoting All Saints’ attorney Marcus 
Owens indicating his client was concerned that “the IRS allowed partisan political 
concerns to direct the course of the All Saints examination.”). 
87. LETTER FROM SENATOR BAUCUS, THEN RANKING MEMBER OF SENATE 
FINANCE TO COMM’R EVERSON (Oct. 29, 2004), reprinted in 2004 TAX NOTES 
TODAY 211–12 (Dec. 2004) (expressing concern that the NAACP was being 
examined for political reasons). 
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needed to investigate a particular activity or a group of activities, and not the 
entire purpose of the organization.
88
 Even with this more limited 
examination, some organizations and commentators complained that the 
standard was unworkable.
89
 
In addition, for constitutional and administrative reasons, the rules 
regarding what constitutes intervention in a political campaign developed 
differently from the rules governing permissible campaign-related activities 
in the election law context. In general, the definition of what constitutes 
campaign-related activity is broader under tax law than under election law. 
 
1. Election Law Rules Governing Campaign-Related Activities 
 
The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) regulates campaign 
contributions and expenditures and, as originally structured, imposed 
contribution limits and disclosure requirements on entities that attempted to 
influence elections.
90
 FECA’s contribution limits and disclosure 
requirements were severely curtailed by the Supreme Court in Buckley v. 
Valeo, where the Court limited the reach of FECA to PACs and to 
contributions and expenditures that expressly advocate the election or defeat 
of a candidate for public office.
91
 In Buckley, the Court set out examples of 
                                                     
88. See Rev. Dr. George F. Regas, Rector Emeritus, Sermon “If Jesus 
Debated Senator Kerry and President Bush” (Oct. 31, 2004), http://www.allsaints-
pas.org/modules/toc/uploads/files/aid959_if_jesus_debated_sen_46b5669b_2eb3_a0
f3_u1.pdf, for the complete transcript of the sermon. The NAACP controversy 
involved a speech at its annual convention. See Michael Janofsky, Citing July 
Speech, I.R.S. Decides to Review N.A.A.C.P., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2004. 
89. See e.g., Mark Totten, The Politics of Faith: Rethinking the 
Prohibition on Political Campaign Intervention, 18 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 298, 309 
(2007); Elizabeth Kingsley & John Pomeranz, A Crash at the Crossroads: Tax and 
Campaign Finance Laws Collide in Regulation of Political Activities of Tax-Exempt 
Organizations, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 55, 70 (2004); Kingsley, Whose Time has 
Passed?, supra note 68. 
90. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431–456 (2000)). 
FECA originally limited contributions to a candidate for federal office to $1,000 
with respect to any election, with the primary and general election each constituting 
a separate election. FECA, 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a) (2000) (amended 2002). The McCain-
Feingold campaign reform bill recently increased this amount to $2,000. Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 307(a), 116 Stat. 81, 102 
(2002) (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441(a)). Entities were also required to disclose 
contributions over $200 that were for the purpose of influencing elections. 2 U.S.C. 
§ 434(c)(1), (c)(2)(C) (2000).  
91. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). Section 431(8)(A)(i) of FECA 
defines contribution as “any gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of money or 
anything of value made by any person for the purpose of influencing any election for 
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words that would constitute express advocacy, and these words have been 
referred to as “magic words.” Examples of magic words include “vote for,” 
“elect,” “support,” “defeat,” “reject,” “vote for Smith.”92 
Organizations could avoid the disclosure requirements in FECA by 
eschewing express advocacy and magic words, but still advocating for or 
against candidates in subtle or not so subtle ways. In the classic case, 
organizations sponsored commercials that were clearly designed to support 
or oppose candidates but avoided magic words, arguing that the speech was 
issue advocacy or grassroots lobbying.
93
 This type of advocacy was referred 
to as “issue advocacy” or “sham issue advocacy.”94 
 
2. Congressional Response to the Lack of Donor Disclosure—
Passage of Disclosure in Section 527 and the Requirement 
of Donor Disclosure for “Electioneering Communication”  
 
The organizational structure of tax-exempt organizations and the 
interaction between election law and tax law changed dramatically in 2000 
when Congress added disclosure provisions to section 527. Now, 
organizations had a major incentive to organize as social welfare 
                                                                                                                             
Federal office,” and section 431(9)(A)(i) defines expenditure as “any purchase, 
payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift of money or anything of value, 
made by any person for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office....” 
2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(A)(i), (9)(A)(i) (2000). 
92. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44 n.52. Later cases recognize that express 
advocacy is broader than the magic words listed in Buckley, and includes express 
advocacy or its functional equivalent. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 
U.S. 93, 206 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 
U.S. 310 (2010) (overruling on other grounds). In Federal Election Commission v. 
Wisconsin Right to Life, the Court determined that a court should find that an ad is 
the functional equivalent of express advocacy only “if the ad is susceptible of no 
reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific 
candidate.” 551 U.S. 449, 469–70 (2007).  
93. One of the classic commercials seeking to take advantage of this 
loophole was run by Republicans for Clean Air as part of the 2000 Republican 
presidential primary. It was later disclosed that the commercial was funding by the 
Wylys who were strong supporters of George Bush. The advertisement stated: “Last 
year, John McCain voted against solar and renewable energy. . . . That means more 
use of coal-burning plants that pollute our air. New York Republicans care about 
clean air. So does Governor Bush. He led one of the first states in America to clamp 
down on old coal-burning electric power plants. . . . Governor Bush: Leading so each 
day dawns brighter.” John Mintz, “Clean Air” Group Clouds the Airwaves, WASH. 
POST, March 3, 2000, at A19.  
94. Richard L. Hasen, The Surprisingly Complex Case for Disclosure of 
Contributions and Expenditures Funding Sham Issue Advocacy, 48 UCLA L. REV. 
265 (2000). 
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organizations, labor unions, or business leagues because those organizations 
were not subject to the disclosure provisions in section 527 and were allowed 
to intervene in political campaigns as long as the primary purpose of the 
organization was consistent with its exempt purpose.
95
 
In addition to the disclosure provisions in section 527, Congress also 
amended FECA as part of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2001 
(BCRA), which among other things, created a new class of communication, 
“electioneering communication,” that would be subject to disclosure.96 
Electioneering communication is defined as “broadcast, cable, or satellite 
communication, which refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal 
office [and] is made within 60 days before a general [election] . . . and 30 
days before a primary . . . and . . . is targeted to the relevant electorate.”97 
Individuals or organizations that spend $10,000 on electioneering 
communication must disclose both the expenditure and the names of donors 
who have contributed $1,000 or more for the purpose of electioneering 
communication.
98
 
Congress therefore addressed the problem of inadequate disclosure 
with a two-pronged approach. It closed the loophole created by the restrictive 
definition of express advocacy by both engaging in entity-based regulation 
by requiring section 527 organizations to disclose, and by engaging in 
speech-based regulation by requiring the disclosure of electioneering 
communication. 
 Independent groups thus sought new ways to engage in political 
advocacy while avoiding the two new regulatory tools designed to require 
the disclosure of donors.
99
  Independent groups accomplished this in two 
steps. First, organizations wishing to avoid disclosure organized as social 
  
                                                     
95. At the time of passage, some scholars were concerned that the 
disclosure provisions would encourage groups to reorganize as social welfare 
organizations. See, e.g., Francis R. Hill, Probing the Limits of Section 527 to Design 
a New Campaign Vehicle, 86 TAX NOTES 400 (2000); Simmons, Campaign Finance 
Reform, supra note 51, at 81. See also Susan Schmidt, Political Groups Change 
Status to Avoid Disclosure, WASH POST, Sept. 15, 2000. 
96. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 
Stat. 81 (2002). 
97. 52 U.S.C. § 30104(f). 
98. Id. 
99. Groups are generally not concerned with entity based disclosure 
because the group itself is generally created for campaign purposes. In addition, 
amounts spent on advertisements often have to be disclosed under FCC regulations. 
See Tobin, Anonymous Speech, supra note 67, at 634 n.108 (citing FCC regulations 
requiring disclosure for advertisements and cases upholding those regulations.). See, 
e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 73.1212 (requiring licensed broadcast stations to identify the 
sponsors of paid advertisements). 
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welfare organizations, labor unions, or business leagues. In order to avoid 
section 527 status and the disclosure provisions in section 527, the 
organizations had to claim that intervention in a political campaign was not 
their primary function. The move by organizations to avoid section 527 
status and take more aggressive positions regarding what constitutes political 
intervention is a foundational change that increased the need for more 
intrusive examination by the IRS. The IRS is now not only required to 
determine whether an organization engages in political campaign-related 
activity, but also whether the political intervention is significant enough that 
the organization can no longer claim its primary purpose is an exempt 
activity under section 501(c). This requires a far more extensive examination 
of the organization’s activities than just examining whether a particular 
communication or activity violated an organization’s exempt status. 
The organizational status of the entity under the Code might be less 
important if campaign disclosure was achieved through alternative means. 
Although not exactly duplicative, the second prong in Congress’s regulatory 
approach, amending FECA to provide for disclosure of electioneering 
communication, should have captured much of the campaign activity that 
was not captured by the disclosure provisions in section 527—either because 
the organization was properly organized under section 501(c) and engaged in 
some advocacy or because the organization was really a political 
organization masquerading as a section 501(c) organization.  After all, much 
of the advocacy at issue met the definition of electioneering communication.   
Congress’s two-pronged approach, however, has failed to provide 
for further disclosure.  The electioneering communications provisions have 
been unsuccessful in requiring disclosure of “sham issue advocacy” by 
SLBs. Although the electioneering communication provisions should have 
required disclosure of these advertisements, regulations by the FEC have 
produced huge loopholes that allow donors to SLBs that engage in 
significant campaign-related activity to remain anonymous.
100
 The FEC 
                                                     
100. According to the Center for Responsive Politics, sixteen 501(c) 
organizations spent over $1,000,000 during the 2010 election cycle. In most cases, 
these organizations did not disclose any of their donors. Eleven of the sixteen 
provided no information about donors, four provided some disclosure, and one 
provided significant disclosure. The one organization that provided more complete 
disclosure was a labor union. See 2010 Outside Spending by Group, 
OPENSECRETS.ORG, last accessed Mar. 11, 2014, http://www.opensecrets.org/ 
outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2010&chrt=D&disp=O&type=I. In 2012, there 
were 25 organizations listed as spending more than $1,000,000. Of the 25 
organizations, 23 provided no disclosure, one partially disclosed and one provided 
more complete disclosure. The one organization providing disclosure was a labor 
union. See Susan B. Anthony List, OPENSECRETS.ORG, last accessed Mar. 11, 2014, 
http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/detail.php?cmte=C90011313&cycle=2
012. 
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issued regulations interpreting BCRA’s electioneering communication 
disclosure provisions providing that an organization must disclose donations 
if the donation is made for the purpose of electioneering communication, but 
if the funds are not designated for electioneering communication, they need 
not be disclosed (even if they are used for such activity).
101
 The premise is 
that, for independent groups that engage in non-campaign-related activities 
(as well as campaign-related activities), donations are made to the group to 
fund its activities generally. Absent a specific designation by the donor, there 
is no indication whether a specific donation was made to fund a particular 
communication by the group. Donors wishing to remain secret may do so 
simply by not affirmatively stating that the contribution is for electioneering 
communication.  
The regulation completely eviscerates donor disclosure rules for 
independent groups because the default position is that a contribution is not 
“for the purpose of electioneering communication,” and therefore is not 
subject to the disclosure rules. Donors have almost no incentive to designate 
their contribution as “for the purpose of electioneering communication.”102 
With the failure of provisions dealing with electioneering 
communication to capture donations to independent groups, attention once 
again focused on the donor disclosure provisions in section 527. If 
organizations could avoid disclosure by claiming status as an SLB, then the 
donor disclosure provisions in section 527 would be ineffectual. Two 
existing tax provisions, the primary purpose requirement and the application 
of the gift tax to donations, had the potential to limit widespread movement 
away from section 527 political organizations to other tax-exempt 
organizations that were not subject to donor disclosure rules. These two 
provisions, however, have failed to achieve this end, largely because of lack 
of enforcement by the IRS. 
 
a. The Primary Purpose Standard Has Failed to Limit 
Political Organizations From Organizing as SLBs 
 
  Although SLBs may intervene in a political campaign on behalf of or 
in opposition to a candidate for public office, the primary purpose of the 
                                                     
101. Electioneering Communication, 72 Fed. Reg. 72899, 72911 (Dec. 26, 
2007) (codified at 11 C.F.R pt. 104, 114) (emphasis added). 
102. Ellen Aprill has explained that a donor’s designation of a contribution 
as for the purpose of electioneering communication would strengthen the donor’s 
argument that the contribution was not a gift and not subject to gift tax. In light of 
the IRS’s announcement that it will not enforce the gift tax for donations to (c)(4)’s, 
there is no incentive for donors to designate contributions. Ellen P. Aprill, Once and 
Future Gift Taxation of Transfers to Section 501(c)(4) Organizations: Current Law, 
Constitutional Issues, and Policy Considerations, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 
289 (2012) [hereinafter Aprill, Once and Future Gift]. 
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organization must still be consistent with its exempt purpose, and political 
campaign activity is not considered consistent with an SLB’s exempt 
purpose. If the primary purpose standard is enforced, then SLBs are a less 
attractive means of subverting the requirements in section 527 because 
organizations must engage in a significant amount of non-campaign-related 
activity to ensure that the organization’s primary purpose remains consistent 
with its exempt purpose. 
Properly constituted organizations could still engage in their core 
function, like labor unions, business leagues, or legislative advocacy, and 
could engage in some political advocacy, because their core function would 
still be consistent with their exempt purpose. Enforcement of the primary 
purpose standard, however, would discourage independent groups engaged 
in political campaigns from emigrating from section 527 and thus avoiding 
campaign disclosure rules. 
The primary purpose standard has been ineffectual in restraining 
groups from emigrating from section 527 political organizations towards 
other exempt organizations primarily because of lax enforcement by the IRS. 
Groups wishing to engage in political advocacy while maintaining section 
501(c) status have argued that their activities are issue advocacy and not 
intervention in a political campaign. In some cases, groups have even argued 
that, as long as they do not engage in express advocacy or electioneering 
communication, they have not intervened in a political campaign.
103
 Lax 
enforcement by the IRS has allowed groups to use an improper and very 
restrictive definition of campaign advocacy, claiming that most of their 
spending is issue advocacy and consistent with their exempt purpose. 
As discussed in Part II.B.4, it is unclear how much activity that is 
inconsistent with a group’s exempt status is allowed under the primary 
purpose standard. Commentators have suggested anywhere from 10 percent 
to 49.9 percent might be allowed under the standard. But even under the 
most generous definition of primary—that more than 50 percent of an 
organization’s activities must be consistent with its exempt purpose—groups 
must still expend significant funds on activities consistent with their exempt 
purpose to satisfy the primary standard. Non-section 527 exempt 
organizations are an inefficient means of intervening in political campaigns 
if the organization must engage in non-electoral activity. Groups therefore 
try to characterize campaign-related activity as issue advocacy, education, or 
lobbying.   
A 2012 study by ProPublica investigated the election disclosures and 
the tax filings of hundreds of exempt organizations.
104
 ProPublica determined 
                                                     
103. See infra note 167 (discussing groups view of permissible activities). 
104. Kim Barker, How Nonprofits Spend Millions on Elections and Call it 
Public Welfare, PROPUBLICA, Aug. 18, 2012, http://www.probublica.ort/article/ 
how-nonprofits-spend-millions-on-elections-and-call-it-public-welfare [hereinafter 
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that organizations were making inconsistent filings with the IRS and the 
FEC.
105
 Organizations made filings with the IRS that indicated they would 
not intervene in an election, but then made filings with the FEC indicating 
election related activities. Other groups disclosed some political spending on 
their Form 990s with the IRS but disclosed even more political spending 
with the FEC.
106
   
It is possible that these groups are making false statements to the 
government, but it is more likely that the groups are choosing to use different 
definitions for purposes of election law and tax law. Apparently, at least 
some groups are arguing that communication is campaign related for 
purposes of election law, but not campaign related for purposes of tax law. 
This is particularly troubling because the tax definition of intervention in a 
political campaign is broader, not narrower, than the election law definition. 
Since there has been very little enforcement by the IRS in this area, 
and limited cases defining primary purpose with regard to intervention in a 
political campaign, groups have been able to organize as SLBs and engage in 
almost unlimited political campaign intervention. 
 
b. Provisions Subjecting Donors to SLBs to Gift Taxes 
Have Failed to Limit Political Organizations From 
Organizing as SLBs  
 
Unlike section 501(c)(3) churches and charities, and section 527 
political organizations, social welfare organizations, labor unions, and 
business leagues are not statutorily exempt from gift tax.
107
 If the gift tax 
applied to donations to these organizations, then donors who contributed 
more than $14,000 would be responsible for paying gift tax on the amount 
donated.
108
 If donors were subject to gift tax, then tax-exempt organizations, 
other than political organizations, would be unattractive as campaign 
vehicles for large contributions. 
 
                                                                                                                             
Barker, Public Welfare]. See Kim Barker & Al Shaw, How Some Nonprofit Groups 
Funnel Dark Money Into Campaigns, PROPUBLICA, Oct. 4, 2012, http://projects. 
propublica.org/dark-money/ for all of the data underlying the ProPublica study. See 
also Julie Patel, Nonprofits’ Failure to Report Political Activity to the IRS Raises 
Questions, CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY, Mar. 4, 2014. 
105. See Barker, Public Welfare, supra note 104. 
106. Id. 
107. I.R.C. § 2501 (gift donor subject to tax if gift exceeds threshold 
amount and donor does not use gift tax exemption). 
108. The gift tax would not apply to Corporations. Individuals could avoid 
paying tax by using part of the estate and gift tax exclusion amount, set at 
$5,340,000 for 2014, but donors rarely want to use up their exemption on political 
contributions. 
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While some argue the gift tax does not apply to SLBs, there is 
significant authority for applying the gift tax to these organizations, and IRS 
rulings indicate that such donations would be subject to gift tax.
109
 In 
addition, there is a specific statutory exemption for gift tax for section 
501(c)(3) and section 527 organizations, which does not exist for SLBs.
110
 
The fact that the exemption exists for section 501(c)(3) organizations and 
section 527 organizations, and that the exemption language was part of 
section 527 when it was enacted in 1975, indicates that Congress believed a 
statutory gift tax exemption was necessary.
111
  
After an estate and gift tax audit raised this issue with regard to a 
taxpayer’s estate, members of the Senate Finance Committee complained to 
the IRS about the enforcement of the gift tax for donors to SLBs.
112
 The IRS 
then issued a notice to its agents that they should not expend examination 
resources on whether the gift tax is applicable to contributions to section 
501(c)(4) organizations.
113
 The IRS indicated it was going to examine this 
issue and determine whether further guidance was necessary. The IRS also 
explained that any future enforcement activity would be prospective and only 
after notice to the public.
114
 
  
                                                     
109. Aprill, Once and Future Gift, supra note 102. 
110. I.R.C. § 2501 (exempts 527 organizations from gift tax); I.R.C. § 
2522(a)(2) (exempts contributions to 501(c)(3) organizations by providing a credit 
against gift tax for charitable contributions). Section 2522 also provides for a credit 
for contributions to associations operating under a lodge system, but only if such 
gifts are to be used exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or 
educations purposes. 
111. Act of Jan. 3, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-625, § 10(a), 88 Stat. 2108, 2116–
19. 
112. Press Release, United States Committee on Finance, Senators to IRS: 
Questions Raised by Agency’s Recent Actions Into Gift Tax Enforcement; Concern 
about Political Influence (May 18, 2011) (asking for names of individuals who made 
the decision to enforce the provision, correspondence between IRS employees, 
Treasury, and White House on the issue, and any analysis generated by the IRS 
regarding First Amendment issues related to the collection—the Senate requested the 
information in nine business days.), http://finance.senate.gov/newsroom/ 
ranking/release/?id=ec29441e-aefd-4192-a628-d96966cf4231.   
113. See Memorandum from Steven T. Miller, Deputy Commissioner for 
Services and Enforcement (July 7, 2011) http://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/ 
guidance_for_irs_sbse_estate_and_gift_tax_and_tege_exempt_organizations.pdf 
[hereinafter Miller, Memo]. For criticism of this IRS decision, see Letter from 
Marcus Owens to Emily S. McMahon (Aug. 8, 2011) http://big.assets. 
huffingtonpost.com/McMahonletter.pdf; Donald B. Tobin, Is Congress Politicizing 
the Tax Enforcement Process?, 2011 TAX NOTES TODAY 162-11 (Aug. 22, 2011) 
(letter to the editor).   
114. Miller, Memo, supra note 113. 
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Interestingly, the IRS’s decision not to enforce the gift tax on 
donations to section 501(c)(4) had a positive impact on Republican 
organizations. At the time of the decision, the number of Republican-leaning 
section 501(c)(4) groups far outnumbered Democratic ones, and lax 
enforcement favored those organizations. By indicating there would be no 
enforcement actions regarding the gift tax and contributions to SLBS, the 
IRS, just several months before the 2012 election, provided SLBs with 
clarification that they could receive unlimited contributions without being 
concerned with the gift tax ramifications of the contributions. The IRS 
announcement removed the last hurdle for political organizations that wished 
to organize as SLBs to avoid disclosure.   
To the extent there is concern regarding political decisions by the 
IRS, the announcement regarding the gift tax could also be seen as a political 
decision. It would just be a political decision favoring Republican-leaning 
organizations. Had the IRS determined that the gift tax applied to donations 
to (c)(4)’s, which would have discouraged contributions to SLBs,  the IRS 
likely would have been accused of engaging in partisan politics in favor of 
democrats. The announcement is a clear case where either action or inaction 
favored a particular party and could be seen as a partisan act. Interestingly, 
the IRS employee who issued the memorandum that arguably favored 
Republican organizations was Steven Miller, the IRS official who was the 
acting Commissioner of the IRS at the time the controversy erupted in 2013 
involving the IRS’s examination of social welfare organizations. 
 
III. THE ROOT CAUSES OF THE 2013 IRS CRISIS 
 
In 2013, the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration 
released a report indicating that the IRS had used partisan criteria in 
evaluating whether to grant tax-exempt status to certain groups.
115
 This 
report unleashed a firestorm of criticism about the IRS and its examination 
practices. The events that followed, including management change at the 
IRS, congressional hearings, and further investigations, produced deeply 
divided narratives about the causes of the crisis and possible solutions. This 
section briefly discusses the crisis, including the facts surrounding the crisis 
and examines the underlying actions by tax-exempt groups that caused many 
academics and politicians to call for enforcement of the current rules 
regarding political campaign intervention and tax-exempt entities. 
  
A. Inspector General Report 
 
On May 14, 2013, the Treasury Inspector General for Tax 
Administration (TIGTA) issued a report concluding that the IRS used 
                                                     
115. TREASURY INSPECTOR, supra note 3. 
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inappropriate criteria to identify tax-exempt applications for review. The 
Inspector General conducted an audit to investigate allegations that the IRS 
was (1) targeting specific groups applying for tax-exempt status for further 
examination; (2) delaying processing of applications for targeted 
organizations; and (3) requesting unnecessary information from targeted 
groups.
116
 The TIGTA report created protest from Members of Congress, 
from conservative groups, and from commentators alleging that the IRS was 
targeting conservative groups in an attempt to suppress political expression 
by conservative groups.  
TIGTA found that the IRS used inappropriate criteria in identifying 
potential cases for further review, including subjecting organizations to 
further examination based on phrases like “Tea Party,” “Patriots” or “9/12 
Project.”117 These inappropriate criteria, such as organization names and 
policies, were used for over eighteen months as a result of insufficient 
management oversight.
118
 According to TIGTA, this resulted in lengthy 
delays, requests for unnecessary information, and a public perception of 
bias.
119
 TIGTA provided three recommendations for the IRS to cure these 
defects: (1) better oversight when modifying the criteria to be used; (2) 
documenting a brief explanation of why applications are chosen for review; 
and (3) holding training or workshops before each election cycle on the 
proper ways to identify applications for review.
120
 
Regarding the allegation of lengthy delays, the investigation found 
that some organizations waited two years or more, and in some cases, two 
election cycles, to find out the results of their application.
121
 More than 80 
percent of the cases chosen for review were open for one year or longer.
122
 
These delays were determined to also be a result of ineffective management 
oversight, and five recommendations were provided to limit delays, 
including development of better processes for monitoring cases and 
requesting assistance from other departments, increasing transparency, 
development of workshops to increase knowledge and training of employees, 
and ensuring better oversight. 
123
 
During TIGTA’s investigation, he examined 170 organizations that 
received requests for additional information and determined 58 percent of 
them had been unnecessary.
124
 This was found to be a result of lack of 
                                                     
116. TREASURY INSPECTOR, supra note 3, at 3. 
117. TREASURY INSPECTOR, supra note 3, at 5–6. 
118. TREASURY INSPECTOR, supra note 3, at 6–7. 
119. TREASURY INSPECTOR, supra note 3, at 7. 
120. TREASURY INSPECTOR, supra note 3, at 10–11. 
121. TREASURY INSPECTOR, supra note 3, at 11, 14. 
122. TREASURY INSPECTOR, supra note 3, at 15. 
123. TREASURY INSPECTOR, supra note 3, at 12, 16–17. 
124. TREASURY INSPECTOR, supra note 3, at 18. 
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managerial review and lack of knowledge regarding the applicable law.
125
 To 
combat this, it was recommended that training or workshops be held before 
each election cycle, addressing which types of additional information are 
appropriate to request and how the questions should be worded.
126
 
Following the release of the report, there was backlash from liberal 
groups who argued that they had also been targeted, weakening the claim 
that the IRS only singled out conservative groups.
127
 Since TIGTA’s 
investigation revealed that around one-third of the applications identified for 
review contained “Tea Party,” “9/12,” or “Patriots” in their name, the 
Director of Rulings and Agreements argued that the remaining two-thirds 
was evidence that the IRS was not solely targeting conservative groups.
128
 
Lois Lerner, the then Director of the IRS Tax-Exempt Organizations 
Division, specifically stated during the TIGTA investigation that some of the 
organizations selected for scrutiny were specifically affiliated with either the 
Democratic or Republican party.
129
 Additionally, in a May 15, 2013 release 
from the IRS, it was stated that, of the 300 cases TIGTA’s investigation 
considered, only around 70 of those were cases involving the name “Tea 
Party.”130 The remaining applications selected for review were for 
organizations of “all political views.”131 The top ranking Democrat on the 
House Oversight Committee argued that interviews with IRS employees held 
before the Committee demonstrated no intentional bias, and even criticized 
the Inspector General for omitting from his report information showing that 
liberal groups had also been targeted, particularly those that used the term 
“progressive.”132 It was also pointed out that, even if Tea Party and other 
                                                     
125. TREASURY INSPECTOR, supra note 3, at 18. 
126. TREASURY INSPECTOR, supra note 3, at 21. 
127. Tom Cohen, IRS Interviews Show No Political Bias, Democrats Say, 
CNN, (July 16, 2013, 2:27 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/16/politics/irs-
scandal/ [hereinafter Cohen, No Political Bias]; Jonathan Weisman, I.R.S. Scrutiny 
Went Beyond the Political, N.Y. TIMES,  July 4, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2013/07/05/us/politics/irs-scrutiny-went-beyond-the-political.html?pagewanted=all 
&_r=0. 
128. TREASURY INSPECTOR, supra note 3, at 8; Martin A. Sullivan, News 
Analysis: Substantial Minority of Scrutinized EOs Were Not Conservative, 139 TAX 
NOTES 1103 (May 30, 2013) [hereinafter Sullivan, Substantial Minority]. 
129. Sullivan, Substantial Minority, supra note 128, at 1103. 
130. Sullivan, Substantial Minority, supra note 128, at 1103. 
131. Sullivan, Substantial Minority, supra note 128, at 1103 (also showing 
that according to Tax Analysts’ research, of the 176 organizations approved by the 
IRS in May for tax-exempt status, 46 used “Tea Party,” “Patriots,” or “9/12 Project” 
in their name, 76 were other conservative organizations, 48 were not conservative 
organizations, and 6 were indeterminable). 
132. See Cohen, No Political Bias, supra note 127; Deirdre Shesgreen, IRS: 
Liberal Groups Got Less Scrutiny Than Tea Party, USA TODAY (June 27, 2013, 
9:54 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/06/27/ways-and-
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conservative groups had been singled out for scrutiny, the only group to have 
actually been denied tax-exempt status was in fact a progressive group.
133
  
 
B. Practices by Tax-Exempt Groups That Prompted Calls for 
Enforcement by the IRS 
 
In general, contrary to the TIGRA report’s conclusion, the IRS was 
likely under enforcing, not over enforcing, rules regulating tax-exempt social 
welfare organizations. While no one is condoning the use of partisan criteria 
in examining a group’s tax-exempt status, groups have been very aggressive 
in seeking social welfare status as a means of avoiding the disclosure 
provisions in section 527. According to the Center for Responsive Politics, 
spending by organizations that do not disclose their donors increased from 
less than $5.2 million in 2006 to well over $300 million in 2012.
134
 
In addition, although it is difficult to determine what communication 
a social welfare group asserts is intervention in a political campaign and 
therefore not social welfare, and what communication groups claim is social 
welfare spending, groups appear to be taking a very aggressive approach in 
classifying their communication as social welfare spending. 
First, groups have treated contributions from one social welfare 
group to another as social welfare spending.
135
 By doing so, groups can 
increase the amount of spending that they claim is for social welfare 
spending. Groups can churn this money as one group gives to another, who 
then gives to another. Each group then claims that amount of money as social 
                                                                                                                             
means-irs-werfel-tea-party/2461573/; Richard Rubin, Tea Party Groups More Likely 
to Get IRS Look Than Others, BLOOMBERG (June 27, 2013, 12:23 PM), 
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Undermines Political Bias Claims, THE GUARDIAN (June 3, 2013, 8:01 PM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/04/irs-tax-scandal-new-evidence; Sam 
Stein & Michael McAuliff, IRS Scandal Investigator ‘Very Concerned’ His Report 
Missed Progressive Targeting, HUFFINGTON POST (July 18, 2013, 5:12 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/18/irs-scandal-report-russell-
george_n_3619102.html . 
133. Joan Walsh, Meet the Group the IRS Actually Denied: Democrats!, 
SALON (May 15, 2013, 8:40 PM) https://www.salon.com/2013/05/15/meet_ 
the_group_the_irs_actually_revoked_democrats/. 
134. Political Nonprofits, OPENSECRETS.ORG, last accessed Mar. 11, 2014, 
http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/nonprof_summ.php. 
135. See CrossroadsGPSChannel, Can’t Afford Patty, YOUTUBE (Oct. 4, 
2010) (commercial by Crossroads GPS attacking Senator Patty Murray), http://www. 
youtube.com/watch?v=nBJTiXvM3_4; Crossroads GPSChannel, Hurting for 
Certain, YOUTUBE (commercial by Crossroad GPS attacking Congressman Sestack),  
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NCBIbj9nOMs [hereinafter Crossroads GPS, 
Hurting for Certain].   
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welfare spending. As groups increase the claimed amount of social welfare 
spending, they create more room for organizations to engage in political 
activity while still claiming their primary purpose is social welfare. A 2013 
study by the Center for Responsive Politics and National Public Radio traced 
the money flow of over $17 million from one donor social welfare 
organization to over 15 organizations.
136
 Another recent study by the Center 
for Responsive Politics and the Washington Post traced over $400 million in 
a “maze of money” that involved the transfer of funds in a 17 entity 
network.
137
 
Second, groups have taken a very aggressive position with regard to 
what constitutes social welfare activity. For example, in 2010, Crossroads 
GPS announced that it was going to spend over $2 million on advertisements 
in Pennsylvania, California, and Kentucky. Crossroads apparently argued 
that these advertisements were not political intervention for purposes of 
determining the group’s social welfare status.138 One advertisement 
provided:  
 
We’re hurting but what are they doing in Washington? 
Congressman Joe Sestak voted for Obama’s big government 
health care scheme. Billions in job-killing taxes and higher 
insurance premiums for hard hit families. Even worse Sestak 
voted to gut Medicare, a $500 billion dollar cut, [and] reduce 
benefits for 850,000 Pennsylvania seniors. Higher taxes and 
premiums, fewer jobs, Medicare cuts—the Sestak/Obama 
plan costs us too much. Tell Congressman Sestak [to] stop 
the Medicare cuts.
139
 
 
 These types of advertisements were exactly the type of political 
advertisements masquerading as “education” or “lobbying” that Congress 
                                                     
136. Viveca Novak, Robert Maguire & Peter Overby, Wellspring’s Flow: 
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138. Dan Froomkin, IRS to Take on Karl Rove? Tax Laws Could Take a 
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was trying to clamp down on when it required disclosure of section 527 
political organizations. 
Finally, there is evidence that groups, either purposefully or 
unknowingly, are claiming that they are engaged in social welfare activity 
when in fact they are engaged in candidate advocacy.  For example, there is 
growing evidence that groups have reported political activity to the Federal 
Election Commission but have then claimed not to have intervened in a 
political campaign for purposes of disclosure to the IRS.
140
 In addition, some 
groups that claimed they were improperly investigated by the IRS appear to 
have been engaged in candidate-related activities. For example, according to 
a press report, We the People Convention argues that it is an educational 
organization, but its conventions in Ohio included, among other things, a 
session on “unified grassroots effort supporting the Josh Mandel 
Candidacy.”141 At the time, Josh Mandel was the State Treasurer and a 
candidate for the United States Senate. 
According to a report in the New York Times, the Wetumpka Tea 
Party trained participants in a get-out-the-vote drive designed to “defeat 
President Barack Obama,” and the Ohio Liberty Coalition organized 
members to distribute presidential campaign literature for Mitt Romney.
142
 
CVFC 501(c)(4), which appears to be associated with Combat Veterans for 
Congress PAC, claimed it was going to be engaged in “social welfare 
programs to assist combat veterans to get involved in government” but then 
spent $8,000 on radio ads in support of a candidate.
143
 CVFC 501(c)(4) 
political spending is not on the group’s From 990 filed with the IRS and the 
group checked “no” to the question of whether it engaged in political 
activities on behalf of a candidate.
144
 Finally, the Ohio Liberty Coalition 
canvassed neighborhoods on behalf of Mitt Romney. The president of the 
organization told the New York Times that, after consulting with a lawyer, 
he believed “that other activities, like distributing literature for the Romney 
campaign, would not raise concerns” and noted that “[i]t’s not political 
activity.”145 
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IV. IMPROVEMENTS TO THE REGULATORY STRUCTURE REGARDING 
TAX-EXEMPT STATUS AND POLITICAL ACTIVITY 
 
The current statutory framework fails to adequately and fairly 
regulate tax-exempt organizations involved in political campaigns. A fair and 
adequate statutory structure needs to respect and value the rights of tax-
exempt organizations and political expression, while honoring congressional 
intent with regard to disclosure and the fact that tax deductible contributions 
should not support political campaign activity.
146
 
Absent the disclosure provisions in section 527, the tax benefits to 
political organizations and SLBs are nearly identical. Neither type of 
organization is entitled to tax subsidized contributions, and neither 
organization is required to pay tax on income related to its exempt function. 
Both types of organizations serve public goals that Congress has determined 
are entitled to tax-exempt status.
147
 Because social welfare, labor, business 
leagues, and political activity is all worthy of tax-exemption, organizations 
that engage in a hybrid activity including some or all of the above should be 
entitled to tax-exempt status. Once it is recognized that political 
organizations, SLBs, and hybrid organizations should all be entitled to tax-
exempt status, the difficult questions regarding primary purpose and political 
activity become less important. The primary purpose test sorts the groups 
into the correct tax category, but absent disclosure, all the groups are entitled 
to tax-exempt status and all the groups are treated similarly. 
Prior to 2000 before disclosure provisions were added to section 527 
but not to section 501(c), the statutory structure worked relatively well. 
Groups sought to organize based on their primary purpose, and there was 
little gamesmanship with regard to an organization’s status.148  The need still 
existed to police the boundary between section 501(c)(3) status and other 
                                                     
146. Although it is outside the scope of this article, allowing all tax-exempt 
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exempt organizations, but there was very little dispute regarding entity status 
within the other exempt organization classifications. 
 
A. Create a Special Designation for Organizations That Wish to 
Intervene in Elections and Require Broad Based Disclosure of 
Donors to These Organizations 
 
Creating a similar disclosure regime for all organizations that wish to 
intervene in political campaigns will greatly simplify the regulatory structure 
and thereby reduce concerns regarding IRS enforcement. With the exception 
of section 501(c)(3) organizations, Congress should create two types of tax-
exempt organizations for each exempt category—one that is allowed to 
intervene in political campaigns and one that agrees to eschew all campaign 
intervention activities. Those organizations that are not interested in 
engaging in campaign activity would not be subject to disclosure obligations 
but would be subject to the same political campaign restrictions applicable to 
section 501(c)(3) churches and charities. Tax-exempt organizations that 
wanted to engage in political campaign advocacy in addition to activities 
consistent with the group’s exempt purpose would be designated with a 
“POL” designation. For example, a group could organize as a section 
501(c)(4) organization or a section 501(c)(4)-POL organization. As 
discussed below, POL organizations would have disclosure obligations and 
would be subject to disclosure on donations above a threshold amount. 
Similar disclosure rules would apply to all tax-exempt organizations that 
chose to be organized as POL organizations.
149
 Tax-exempt organizations 
would be subject to additional disclosure if the organization engaged in 
activities covered by election law. 
By broadening disclosure but raising the disclosure limits, Congress 
would drastically reduce an organization’s administrative burdens while also 
reducing enforcement costs. Since disclosure would be based on an 
organization’s status and dollar value of the donations, there would be 
significantly less need for IRS examination of an organization’s activities. 
Tracing rules would need to be developed to ensure that shell corporations or 
entities were not used as a means of subverting the disclosure requirements, 
but broad disclosure rules capturing large dollar donations will significantly 
simplify the process. 
In addition, a more uniform regime would have the benefit of 
reframing the political intervention prohibition as a binary test. The question 
will be whether the organization engages in any campaign-related activity, 
                                                     
149. Section 527 organizations are currently required to disclose 
contributions in excess of $200 and expenditures in excess of $500. I.R.C. § 
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not the quantity of such activity. It will also allow rules to be put in place to 
define campaign activity in the context of this binary choice. In examining 
campaign activity in distinguishing between a non-disclosing tax-exempt 
organization and a “POL,” many of the difficult determinations that currently 
exist with the facts and circumstances test could be overcome by creating a 
definition of political campaign activity that is very broad. Once the 
distinction is between whether an organization is subject to disclosure or not, 
the consequences of a broad-based rule would be more disclosure, which 
would not have a drastic impact on free speech rights. Since the organization 
has an easy, not overly burdensome alternative if it wishes to engage in such 
activity, strict rules with strict application do not pose a heavy burden. Strict 
rules would still allow organizations that wish to avoid political campaign 
type activities also to avoid disclosure. 
In 2013, a group of tax experts published what they termed the 
“bright line project.” The goal of the project was to create a test that would 
create more certainty with regard to the standard for determining whether an 
activity was impermissible political campaign activity. The “bright line 
project” is an extremely thoughtful and detailed response to the current 
problem, but the bright line project itself highlights the problems of creating 
bright lines. In order to deal with an extremely complicated subject, the 
recommendations from the bright line project are extremely complicated.
150
 
But if one limits the task to policing the non-disclosing tax-exempt 
organization/POL line, then the project may become a little easier.
151
 
Activities like endorsing a candidate, using the organization’s resources to 
support a candidate, running commercials that promote or oppose a particular 
candidate, or engaging in more than an insubstantial amount of grassroots 
lobbying close in time to a political campaign would be prohibited, unless 
the organization registered as a “POL” organization and disclosed its donors. 
The 2013 proposed regulation on social welfare organizations provides a 
nice framework for creating a bright-line rule to police the tax-exempt 
organization/POL line. 
More nuanced activity like prohibiting organizations from engaging 
in electioneering communication, which poses significant problems of over 
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inclusiveness with regard to section 501(c)(3) organizations, is less difficult 
in the tax-exempt/POL situation. Even though some electioneering 
communication might not be political campaign activity, a bright line could 
still be created indicating that only POL organizations could engage in 
electioneering communication.
152
 The fact that some electioneering 
communication might not be political campaign intervention activity, 
however, is less of a concern since organizations would still have a means of 
engaging in that communication.
153
 They would simply have to organize as a 
POL and disclose donors over the threshold amount. 
The distinction between non-political tax-exempt organizations and 
POL tax-exempt organizations would significantly decrease the enforcement 
burden on the IRS and would create a more transparent means of 
determining whether an organization was subject to the disclosure regime. 
 
B. Provide for Transparency of Donor Contributions by Disclosing 
Large Contributions to Tax-Exempt Organizations 
 
The new POL category will provide for disclosure of donors to 
organizations engaged in political activity. This broad-based disclosure 
should be accompanied by simplification rules to make it easier for groups to 
comply and to eliminate some over disclosure that may occur. Congress 
should set a high disclosure limit, around $10,000-$25,000, for disclosure of 
individual names and donations. Because an unlimited number of 
corporations can be created, Congress should require all contributions from 
corporations to be disclosed. Donor disclosure should be made within seven 
days of the contribution. Requiring donor disclosure will improve 
enforcement and decrease the attractiveness of using SLBs as a means of 
circumventing the disclosure provisions in section 527.
154
 The threshold 
amount for donor disclosure in this proposal is purposefully set very high to 
ease administrative burdens while still capturing donations that have the 
potential to cause corruption or the appearance of corruption.  Disclosure of 
large contributions also provides the type of information to voters that the 
Supreme Court has held justify disclosure provisions.   
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Donors that wished to contribute anonymously to an organization’s 
non-political campaign primary purpose activity could still do so by donating 
to a connected non-POL organization.
155
 
Donor disclosure reduces both actual corruption and the appearance 
of corruption,
156
 and it provides a signaling and information function to 
voters.
157
 Donor disclosure by tax-exempt organizations will also restore 
some coherence to the regulatory structure by treating similar tax-exempt 
organizations similarly. 
Because tax-exempt organizations are already required to disclose 
donors of $5,000 or more on their Form 990s, and because disclosure here is 
aimed only at large donations, the disclosure requirement should not be very 
burdensome for tax-exempt organizations.
158
 
 
C. Require SLBs to File for Recognition 
 
The 2013 IRS crisis involved the IRS using inappropriate partisan 
criteria to examine, and in some cases delay, the applications of groups 
seeking tax-exempt status. One of the bizarre aspects of this crisis is that 
many of the groups in the examination/delay category were not even required 
to apply for tax-exempt status. Although there is an application process for 
those seeking SLB status (Form 1024), groups are not required to apply and 
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be disclosed. A blanket disclosure requirement for all large donations to SLBs 
engaged in political campaign activity is preferable, however, because segregated 
accounts and designated donations would recreate the problems in the current 
enforcement regime of line-drawing between campaign and non-campaign activity, 
questionable enforcement, and distrust of government action. A binary switch that 
requires disclosure for organizations that wish to engage in political campaign 
activity and those that do not greatly simplifies enforcement and reduces the chances 
of uneven or biased enforcement actions. 
156. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27 (1976); Nixon v. Shrink Missouri 
Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 390 (2000); McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 
U.S. 93, 144 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 
U.S. 310 (2010); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 366 
(2010). 
157. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366. 
158. Some type of tracing rule would need to exist with regard to donor 
disclosure to avoid the problems that currently exist in the election law context with 
regard to electioneering communication. The tax-exempt organization would need to 
disclose its donors, but in the case of corporate donors, would also need to disclose 
major donors to the corporate donor.  Otherwise, shell corporations could be used as 
a means of circumventing the disclosure requirements. 
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may “self-declare.”159 Self-declaring organizations are still required to file a 
Form 990 but these organizations are not required to do so until several 
months after the close of their taxable year.  
If an organization may self-declare, then there is no automatic time 
at which the IRS examines whether an organization meets the regulatory 
requirements of the statute. In addition, if transparency and disclosure 
requirements are put in place, then a required application process would be 
necessary to enforce the new regulatory requirements. A simplified 
application process, including an express review of applications, could be put 
in place for small organizations with anticipated contributions below a 
threshold amount.
160
  
  
D. Express Consideration of Applications for Exempt-Status 
 
 One of the main problems in the 2013 crisis involved delay in processing 
applications for exempt status. Under existing rules, inaction by the IRS may 
be even more harmful than action with a negative decision. Some believe 
that, in the 2013 crisis, the IRS used inaction and requests for information as 
a way of avoiding making decisions with regard to an organization’s exempt 
status. The IRS may have been avoiding political controversy by delaying 
decisions, and thereby avoiding the political controversy of having to deny or 
grant exempt-status to organizations. The groups subject to the delay, 
however, had no recourse to move the process forward (except for the ability 
in some circumstances to self-declare or petition members of Congress). 
As part of the transparency reforms, Congress should also require the 
IRS to set up procedures to quickly review the Form 1024s that are filed. The 
IRS should be required to provide an initial determination with regard to an 
organization’s status within 30 days of receiving an organization’s 
application for SLB status. If the IRS failed to act within the 30-day period, 
then the group’s application for exemption would be deemed approved. This 
might result in extremely complicated groups receiving approval while the 
IRS was still investigating the organizations, but because these organizations 
would be subject to disclosure and because these organizations would still be 
required to file Form 990s at a later date, this initial application would not be 
the only chance for the IRS to investigate an organization. Congress should 
                                                     
159. See Reg. § 1.6033-1(e) (Social welfare organizations can be 
“nondeclaring” social welfare organizations. Even if an organization does not file for 
recognition, it is required to file a Form 990 information return.). 
160. Currently, groups that anticipate contributions to be below $25,000 are 
not subject to section 527s disclosure requirements. I.R.C. § 527(i)(5). 
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also establish a process for allowing groups denied SLB status to appeal that 
decision to a Federal court.
161
 
 
E. Clarify Primary Purpose Standard 
 
Congress should clarify the requirements for tax-exempt status. As 
previously discussed, under current law, an organization qualifies as an SLB 
if it is primarily engaged in activities consistent with the purposes of the 
exempt category.
162
 Outside of the section 501(c)(3) area, the IRS has not 
provided sufficient guidance regarding how an organization meets the 
primary purpose standards. Options range from an organization only being 
allowed to engage in an insubstantial amount of non-exempt activity to 
organizations being exempt as long as over half of its expenditures are for an 
exempt function.
163
 Some of the reforms discussed earlier will reduce the 
need to apply the primary purpose test. Under current law, the primary 
purpose test serves as the sorting device for determining whether an 
organization qualifies for SLB status or whether the organization must 
organize as a section 527 organization and be subject to the disclosure 
regime in section 527. If the disclosure requirements are made more uniform, 
then the primary purpose standard becomes less essential, and it becomes 
easier to create a clear bright-line test. 
If a standard disclosure rule is used for all non-section 501(c)(3) 
exempt organizations, then a bright line primary purpose standard may be 
more palatable. For example, under current law, a dividing line based on the 
expenditures of an organization is unsatisfactory. An organization might 
spend almost all of its expenditures on activity consistent with its exempt 
purpose, but also organize thousands of volunteers to engage in non-exempt 
activity. The magnitude of the volunteer hours might change the primary 
purpose of the organization, and the organization might be more 
appropriately designated as a section 527 political organization. If one 
recognizes that the organization is entitled to exempt status and the question 
is merely under what provision, then there is less concern regarding how to 
treat volunteer hours. The organization is clearly exempt. 
In addition, if disclosure applies more broadly, then there will also 
be less concern about the content of particular communications. Under 
current law, groups are claiming that communication that is campaign related 
is instead issue advocacy. In order to determine whether the communication 
is in fact issue advocacy or intervention in a political campaign, the IRS 
applies a facts and circumstances test, discussed in Part II.C.2. This test 
                                                     
161. Section 501(c)(3) groups that are denied tax-exempt status may seek a 
declaratory judgment in district court. I.R.C. § 7428. 
162. Supra Part II.B.1. 
163. Comments of the Individual Members, supra note 55. 
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requires significant analysis by the IRS and requires the IRS to make 
politically sensitive judgments regarding what is and what is not political 
activity. 
If broad disclosure is implemented, then Congress could then create 
clear safe harbor provisions regarding the primary purpose test. The 
organization’s primary purpose would be determined based on exempt 
activity upon which the organization spent a majority of its funds. The IRS in 
its recent attempts to approve the backlog of tax-exempt applications has 
adopted a type of bright-line test applying a 40 percent standard, and 
members of the ABA tax section have recommended a 40 percent safe 
harbor with some additional restrictions. The 40 percent safe harbor being 
used or suggested is premised on the old disclosure paradigm.
164
 If disclosure 
was more broadly required, then a 50 percent safe harbor would be 
appropriate. 
In addition, as discussed in Part II.C.1., since the determination here 
would be sorting an organization to its proper category, the facts and 
circumstances test for political campaign intervention could be simplified.
165
 
If Congress does not broaden the disclosure requirements, then the primary 
purpose standard, along with the political campaign intervention test, will 
continue to play a major role in regulating the activities of SLBs and section 
527 political organizations. Absent disclosure reforms, Congress should 
clarify what “primary” means with regard to section 501(c)(4) organizations 
and should clarify that an organization that fails the primary test because it 
engages in too much political intervention qualifies as a section 527 political 
organization. The political campaign intervention fact-based test would still 
do the heavy lifting with regard to determining what activities qualified in 
determining an organization’s primary purpose. A clarified test, without 
more, would still create significant problems with regard to enforcement. If 
Congress is going to rely on the fact-based test for determining primary 
purpose, it is even more important that Congress create an enforcement 
mechanism, outside of the IRS, designed to create an independent and fair 
process for enforcing the primary purpose standard. 
 
F. Redesign Form 990 to Clarify Rules Regarding Election-Related 
Activities 
 
Redesigning Form 990 and clarifying a group’s election-related 
activities will provide information to tax-exempt organizations and simplify 
the enforcement process. As the 2013 IRS crisis evolved, it became clear that 
                                                     
164. See Comments of Individual Members, supra note 55, at 8. 
165. This simplified test would not work in the 501(c)(3) situation. 
Treatment of the political intervention test for religious organizations and charities is 
outside the scope of this article. 
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one of the problems in this area was that tax-exempt groups misunderstood, 
were misinformed, or purposefully violated the laws regarding political 
activities of tax-exempt groups. One study by ProPublica noted drastic 
discrepancies between what organizations claimed on their exemption 
applications, the groups’ Form 990s, and the disclosures groups made to the 
FEC.
166
 Some of these discrepancies may have been due to mistakes on the 
part of the organizations and some may be due to aggressive interpretations 
about the law by tax-exempt groups,
167
 but clear questions on the Form 990 
with regard to political activity will eliminate some of these inadvertent 
mistakes and will streamline enforcement. 
The current Form 990 requires organizations to disclose if they 
“engage[d] in direct or indirect political campaign activities on behalf of or 
in opposition to candidates for public office.”168 Organizations, however, are 
making this representation based on their own interpretation of what 
qualifies as intervention in a political campaign. Specific questions on the 
Form 990 would focus the attention of tax-exempt groups to their activities 
and would provide information to the IRS to allow for appropriate 
enforcement. 
For example, questions on the Form 990 could include: Does your 
organization, or members of your organization in association with 
organization activities, engage in or plan to engage in any of the following 
activities: 
 
- Fund, support, provide expertise or advice with regard to any 
TV, radio, Internet, or print advertisement that mentions a name, 
likeness, or office of a candidate for public office? 
- Engage in distribution of material through any means that 
mentions the name of a candidate? 
- Participate in rallies, events, or meetings with political 
candidates? 
 
Answering “yes” to any of these questions would not mean a group 
was in violation of its tax-exempt status, but it would provide clear guidance 
to groups about the type of activities that might be political campaign 
intervention. It will also provide a starting point for the IRS in its 
investigations whether groups are violating their tax-exempt status. 
                                                     
166. Barker, Public Welfare, supra note 104. 
167. See Confessore & Luo, Groups Targeted, supra note 142 at A1 
(finding some of the groups in the Inspector General’s report claimed not to be 
engaged in campaign-related activity but spent funds on radio ads on behalf of a 
candidate, other groups claimed that a partisan get-out-the-vote effort was 
“educational,” and one group canvassed in favor of Mitt Romney but claimed that he 
thought the activity was okay as long as it wasn’t radio or television advertising.). 
168. I.R.S. Form 990 (2012), Part IV, Line 3. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
 
As the 2013 IRS crisis makes clear, the IRS is poorly equipped to 
regulate the campaign activities of tax-exempt organizations. The Federal 
Election Campaign Act, the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, and the 
addition of disclosure provisions to section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code 
all evidence Congress’s intent that “candidate-related political advocacy” be 
subject to a meaningful disclosure regime. Independent organizations have 
been manipulating campaign finance rules and tax rules to avoid campaign 
finance and tax disclosure provisions. The 2013 crisis highlights, however, 
that the IRS is the wrong entity to police disclosure provisions. If the IRS is 
going to be charged with enforcement, then the statutory regime must be 
structured as to avoid, as much as possible, broad agency discretion. In 
addition, the disclosure provisions should apply broadly so organizations will 
not have an incentive to manipulate organizational form to avoid disclosure. 
A statutory structure with bright-line rules and broad-based disclosure will 
increase compliance and decrease agency discretion, thus limiting the 
opportunity for perceived or actual political manipulation of the enforcement 
process. 
 
 
 
